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The United States pharmaceutical supply chain is one of the safest and most secure 
systems in the world. However, in recent years, an increasing number of drug counterfeit 
products were detected in it. This increase in documented incidents greatly concerns the 
pharmaceutical industry, and state and federal regulatory bodies. The repercussions of a 
tainted drug supply chain are potentially economically devastating and detrimental to the 
health and well-being of the public. Decision makers face a challenge keeping the drug 
supply chain safe from these influences, specifically assessing the risk of drug 
counterfeiting. With the problems posed by counterfeit, the identification of the right 
counterfeit attributes and the development of models to help supply chain managers 
determine the probability of counterfeit drugs are vital. Known drug counterfeiting 
research and studies are limited in scope; and despite increasing trends in counterfeiting, 
empirical research in this area is scarce. This research undertakes an in-depth 
  
examination of literature to identify counterfeit attributes and factors as well as to 
develop a drug counterfeit model to assess the probability of the drug counterfeiting. The 
identification of drug counterfeiting attributes resulted from a comprehensive review of 
the literature and a survey of experts. Data were subsequently collected on the attributes 
identified through literature, case studies, and experts.  
The findings of this research led to these substantive outcomes: 
• The identification of 10 key counterfeit attributes: Average Price, Drug Class, 
Medication Class, Product Type, Volume, Product Complexity, Product 
Location, Region, Previous Product Counterfeiting, and Product Shortage.  
• Using exploratory factor analysis, a model emerged with three distinct factors: 
Market, Product History, and Supply Chain Characteristics.  
• A process and a model are developed to assess the probability of drug 
counterfeiting. This is the first known model developed to assess the 
probability of drug counterfeiting.  
Decision makers can assess products in an objective and robust way to determine which 
products are of greater risk of counterfeiting, and to develop policies and strategies to 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Background and Motivation 
The United States pharmaceutical supply chain is one of the safest and most secured 
systems in the world (Lutter, 2006). However, in recent years, an increasing number of 
drug counterfeit products were detected in the supply chain. This increase in documented 
incidents is of great concern to the pharmaceutical industry, and state and federal 
regulatory bodies. The repercussions of a tainted drug supply chain are potentially 
devastating not just economically but also to the health and well-being of the public. The 
need exists for proactive methods to help supply chain managers or regulatory risk 
managers assess the probability of counterfeit drug products in the legitimate 
pharmaceutical supply chain (PSC).  
 
The counterfeiting of pharmaceuticals extends beyond borders and is a global problem. 
Globalization and pharmaceutical manufacturing outsourcing significantly contributed to 
the increased volume of imported drugs into the United States and the global surge in 
counterfeiting (see Figure 1), especially in countries that are more involved in 









Figure 1: Global Counterfeits Incidents (PSI, 2014) 
 
According to the Pharmaceutical Security Institute (PSI, 2014), counterfeiting of 
pharmaceuticals has steadily increased since 2002. In 2012, 2018 counterfeiting incidents 
were recorded by PSI (see Figure 1). Of these, 41 % (841) were discovered by Customs 







Figure 2: Number of Counterfeiting, Illegal Diversion and Theft Events from CY2002 to 
CY 2012 (PSI, 2014) 
 
Also, of the counterfeit seizures taken by Customs or as a result of police/health inspector 
raids in CY 2012, 52% were commercial and 40% were non-commercial (see Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 3: Percentage of Counterfeit Seizures in CY 2012 taken by customs or police/health 






Keeping the nation’s drug supply safe and effective includes keeping a vigilant eye on all 
stages of the pharmaceutical process, from acquiring the active pharmaceutical 
ingredients (APIs) to importation and distribution of the finished dosage form (FDF) drug 
products into the country. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is one agency 
responsible for keeping the nation’s drug supply safe and effective. In doing so, the FDA 
will need advanced analytical methods and processes to detect and deter counterfeit drugs 
entering the legitimated supply chain.  
 
The complexity of the global supply chain inherently introduces risks (counterfeiting, 
theft, nature-disasters, technological accidents, malicious events, etc.) that impact the 
quality of the drug supplies in the United States. Decision makers face a challenge 
keeping the drug supply chain safe from these influences, specifically assessing the risk 
of drug counterfeiting.  
 
Counterfeit drugs are a global pandemic. In 2009, FDA estimated that in parts of Asia, 
counterfeit drugs accounted for more than 50 percent of medicinal sales, and resulted in 
the deaths of several thousand people every year (Paul, 2009). Several counterfeit cases 
initiating from Asia, resulted in mortalities from poisonous pharmaceutical ingredients 
flowing into the global market through traders and intermediaries, who forme a supply 
chain that stretched from small factories in rural China to consumers around the world. 
 
 
A report published by General Accountability Office (GAO) in 2005 on prescription 





public regarding the safety and quality of drugs purchased from foreign sources, which 
are largely outside their regulatory system….” (GAO, 2011). 
 
1.2 Significance of the Problem 
It is imperative that the United States pharmaceutical supply chain provides safe and 
effective drugs to consumers. Since 2000, an increasing number of Americans have 
received counterfeit medicines from legitimate pharmacies (Eban, 2005). These 
counterfeit medicines look similar to the legitimate product. They are delivered in 
packaging that are identical to the authentic product, all of this unbeknownst to 
pharmacists and medical professionals. The gray markets through which these medicines 
travel easily, obscure their origin. Cherici et al (2011) describes the gray market as a 
supply channel for unofficial, unauthorized or unintended manufacturer. For example, 
products that are scare or short in supply, gray markets may enter or evolve to sell the 
item at any price the market will bear. In addition, gray markets also compete with 
innovator’s product by selling products at a lower cost.  
 
Without readily available methods or ability to ensure purity and legitimacy, counterfeit 
drugs pose a serious risk. These drugs, traveling the gray markets, can be less effective 
than legitimate drugs and can lead to sinister outcomes such as serious health impact or 
death. With the problems posed by counterfeit drugs it is vital that the right counterfeit 
attributes are identified and that models are developed to help supply chain managers 






1.3 Research Objective and Methodology 
The objective of this dissertation is to (1) identify and analyze the factors that can be 
utilized to assess the probability of drug counterfeiting in the pharmaceutical supply 
chain (PSC), and (2) develop a counterfeit drug model to help supply chain risk managers 
(SCRMs) rank drug products by their likelihood of being counterfeit. 
 
Research in drug counterfeiting is limited in scope and provides high-level overview of 
drug counterfeiting. Despite increasing trends in counterfeiting, empirical research in this 
area is scarce. Sodipo’s (1997) research related to Agreement on Trade Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) provides a list of attributes influencing 
counterfeiting. Spink’s (2009) research on anti-counterfeiting strategies and a product 
risk model used Sodipo’s risk factors, however, in both research, factors significance as 
they related to drug counterfeiting was not explored. 
 
To date, current methods fail to adequately identify critical factors and to develop a 
model to evaluate the likelihood of product counterfeiting within the PSC. Most methods 
focus on disruptions and optimization in the supply chain, with limited focus on drug 
counterfeiting. This research undertakes an in-depth examination of literature to identify 
counterfeit factors as well as to develop a drug counterfeit model to assess the likelihood 
of the drug counterfeiting.  
 
Figure 4 shows the framework utilized in this research. This includes a comprehensive 





pertaining to drug counterfeiting. Data were subsequently collected on the attributes that 
were identified through literature, case studies, and experts. An explanatory factor 
analysis method was used to analyze the counterfeit attributes. A drug counterfeit model 











1.4 Research Contribution 
This research adds to the body of knowledge in a number of ways. First, it identifies, and 
provides an analysis of the attributes that affect drug counterfeiting. Second, this research 
develops a counterfeit drug model for ranking drug products at greatest risk of 
counterfeiting. Prior to this research, there were no known studies to the author 
knowledge, that adequately identified and analyzed counterfeit attributes and effectively 
described their effects on the probability of drug counterfeiting. Additionally, the drug 
counterfeit model developed in this dissertation can be used by supply chain, project, and 
regulatory risk managers to help allocate resources for drug product testing based on the 
probability of drug counterfeiting.  
 
1.5 Dissertation Outline 
The remaining chapters of this dissertation are organized as follows: 
• Chapter 2 provides a review of the literature produced by previous research 
related to counterfeit attributes for drugs as well as other products. New and 
emerging trends in drug counterfeiting from a pharmaceutical supply chain are 
discussed. 
• Chapter 3 provides a discussion of the research methodology used for the 
collection and analysis of counterfeit attributes. This chapter highlights the 
importance of each counterfeit attribute. 
• Chapter 4 describes the data collection methodology and provides a descriptive 





• Chapter 5 explains the explanatory factor analysis approach and uses this 
approach to analyze counterfeit attributes interrelationships. Regression analysis 
is applied to determine the significance of each factor. 
• Chapter 6 explains and develops a drug counterfeit model for determining the 
probability of counterfeiting.  
• Chapter 7 explains a Bayesian Uncertainty analysis framework and applies the 
framework to improve model prediction. Model validation is presented with 
known drug counterfeit cases and cases that were not counterfeits. 
• Chapter 8 discusses research implications for the drug industry (public and 
private entities) and discusses limitations of the research and recommendations 










Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a literature review on pharmaceutical product counterfeiting and 
describes the trends, definitions of counterfeiting, and provides a summary of counterfeit 
attributes. 
 
2.2 Drug Counterfeit Definition 
According to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 
 
 “U.S. law defines counterfeit drugs as those sold under a product name without proper 
authorization. Counterfeiting can apply to both brand name and generic products, where 
the identity of the source is mislabeled in a way that suggests that it is the authentic 
approved product. Counterfeit products may include products without the active 
ingredient, with an insufficient or excessive quantity of the active ingredient, with the 
wrong active ingredient, or with fake packaging”, (FDA, 2013).  
 
The World Health Organization (WHO) defines counterfeit medicine or drugs as “…one 
which is deliberately and fraudulently mislabeled with respect to identity and/or source. 
Counterfeiting can apply to both branded and generic products and counterfeits products 





active ingredients, with insufficient active ingredients or with fake packaging (WHO, 
2012).”  
 
2.3 Drug Counterfeiting: Global Problem 
Counterfeit drugs, both prescription and over-the-counter are a worldwide epidemic and a 
threat to public health (Martino et. al 2010) (Figure 5.0). According to Martino, 
“counterfeiting also constitutes an economic problem for legitimate drug manufacturers, 
undermining their revenues and reputation....The global trade in counterfeit medicines is 
vast and growing as it is as hugely lucrative business owing to the continued high 
demand for cheap medicines and low production costs.”  
 
 






According to the World Health Organization (WHO), counterfeit drugs have become 
lucrative business and attracted organized crime. Innovative modern technology has 
provided counterfeiters with advanced methods for duplicating products and packaging 
(WHO, 2010).  It is estimated that globally, approximately $75 billon was attributed in 
2010 to counterfeit drug sales, an increase of 90 % from 2005 (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010).   
 
The absence of or weak drug regulations contribute to growing counterfeiting, globally. 
According to WHO, out of 191 member states only 20% have a well-developed drug 
regulatory body; 50 % have some-sort of operational system, and the remaining 30% 
have either no drug regulation or very limited capacity to regulate manufacturers. These 
factors encourage counterfeiters because there is no penalty or repercussion for their 
actions. 
 
Eyisi and Wertheimer (2012) identify other factors that fuel counterfeiting. First, 
individuals who are not aware of illicit products buy them because they do not know the 
problem exists and therefore, are not careful about what they buy. Second, criminals 
although they may have no pharmaceutical education, do have access to manufacturing 
systems by which they can imitate genuine drugs. Third, criminal organizations are 
becoming more interested in counterfeit drugs, driven by the enormous turnover and 
profit margins.  
 
Weak supply chains and the internet create opportunities for intermediaries or middlemen 





counterfeiters to enter the distribution channel (Eyisi & Wertheimer, 2012). In recent 
times, the internet has become a major magnet for counterfeiters. According to WHO 
Internal Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce (IMPACT), approximately 50 
% of drugs from internet sites are counterfeit (IMPACT, 2008). 
 
According to the FDA, 
 
“An individual who receives a counterfeit drug may be at risk for a number of 
dangerous health consequences. Patients may experience unexpected side effects, 
allergic reactions, or a worsening of their medical condition. A number of 
counterfeit products do not contain any active ingredients, and instead contain 
inert substances, which do not provide the patient any treatment benefit. 
Counterfeit drugs may also contain incorrect ingredients, improper dosages of the 
correct ingredients, or they may contain hazardous ingredients (FDA, 2014).”  
 
 
Individuals taking counterfeit medicines are usually not aware of the health risks. There 
are many pathways through which a consumer may purchase drugs whether it is over the 
internet or over-the-counter. Regulatory agency may actively work to secure the 
pharmaceutical supply chain; but weak regulations, cheap drugs, and human element 







2.4 Drug Counterfeiting Statistics 
According to WHO, counterfeits make up approximately 10 % of the global drug market 
and appear in both industrialized and developing countries. Perhaps, 25 % of drugs 
consumed in poor countries are counterfeit or substandard and annual revenues obtained 
in from these sales amounts to roughly US$ 32 billion 
(http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/2003/fs275/en). Chakrabarti (2003) provides 
a list of counterfeit statistics from 1982 to present, and indicated the need for proactive 







Table 1 : Counterfeit Events by Year 
Year Counterfeit Event Description 
1982-1997 
“Between 1982 and 1997, there were 751 cases reported of counterfeit drugs found 
in at least 28 countries. In 25 % of the cases, the drugs were reported to come from 
industrialized countries, 65% from developing countries, and 10% from unspecified 
sources (WHO press release, November 1997).” 
1995 
“In 1995, 89 people died in Haiti after ingesting cough syrup manufactured with 
diethylene glycol (a chemical commonly used as anti-freeze). This particular 
product was made in China and transported through a Dutch company to Germany, 
before winding up on the Haitian market (Sanofi-Aventis)”. 
 
1999-2000 
“According to WHO, between January 1999 and October 2000, they received 46 
incident reports from 20 countries, 60 % of which were from developing countries 
(IFPW Focus, June, 2002).” 
2000-2001 
“42 reports of counterfeits from 20 countries during 2000 and 2001 (WHO, 2002) 
or 46 reports from 20 countries 60 % of which came from developing countries 
(IFPW Focus, June 2002).” 
 
2001 
“According to WHO, 5-8% of the worldwide trade in pharmaceutical is counterfeit 
(Security Management, 9/1/01).” 
 
2006 
Liang (2006) stated that the FDA “estimates that ~1% or less of drugs in the United 
States are tainted or counterfeited. Assuming only one tenth of one percent of drugs 
in the US are affected…more than 3.5 million to 350 million US prescriptions may 
be potentially affected by counterfeit drugs each year.”  
 
2006 
“In 2006, an unlicensed Chinese chemical plant sold a cheap poisonous counterfeit 
ingredient, diethylene glycol, which was mixed into cold medicine. It was later 
shipped to Panama, killing hundreds of people and disabling dozens more. The 
deadly drugs were traced back to a handful of Chinese companies that made and 




According to WHO (2010), “over 50% of cases, medicines purchased over the 




The National Association Board of Pharmacy (NABP) estimated 1-2% of drugs in 
North America are fraudulent (NABP,2010). 
 
2010 
According to NABP (2010), “counterfeit sales are increasing at nearly twice the 
pace of legitimate pharmaceutical sales- estimated at 13% annually by the Center 
for Medicine and Public Interest.”  
2012 
In February, 2012, Roche a subsidiary of Genetech stated that counterfeit copies 
Avastin (cancer drug) which do not contain any active ingredient entered the US 







Bernstein and Shuren (2006) emphasized that there is no direct quantitative evidence to 
characterize the scope of counterfeiting in the US–PSC and attribute this to 
counterfeiters’ abilities to replicate the genuine products well. The current outlook on 
counterfeit drugs in the US-PSC is not promising. However, from counterfeit seizures 
data, there is a consistent upward trend of counterfeit drugs entering the legitimate supply 
chain as discussed in Chapter 1. Furthermore, the true extent of counterfeiting globally is 
unknown because there is no accurate or adequate source of data to quantify the problems 
as countries are not keeping records or reporting incidences of drug counterfeiting (Obi-
Eyisi & Wertheimer, 2012). 
 
2.5 Public Health Risk  
There are many risks associated with taking counterfeit drugs. Consumers may not get 
appropriate therapeutic benefits or may experience adverse effects (Reggie, 2007; 
Newton et al, 2010). Newton et al (2010) provides a list of impacts: 
• Increase mortality and morbidity; 
• Engendering of drug resistance and loss of medicine efficacy; 
• Loss of confidence in health systems and health workers; 
• Economic loss for patients, their families, health systems, and the produces 
and traders in good-quality medicines; 
• Adverse effect from incorrect active ingredients; 
• Waste of enormous human effort and financial outlay in development of 
medicines, optimizing dosage, carrying out clinical trials, discussing policy 





• Increased burden for health workers, medicine regulatory authorities, customs 
officials and polices offices. 
 
2.5 Economic Impact 
 The Pharmaceutical Security Institute (PSI) estimated the size of the counterfeit drug 
market ranges from approximately $ 75 billion to $ 200 billion per year. PSI also 
estimated 800 fake versions of pharmaceutical products were manufactured around the 
globe in just 2009 (USA Today, 2010). Wertheimer and Norris (2009) explored the effect 
of counterfeit drugs on the macro-economy of a country. They stated that if the direct 
cost of therapies required in the treatment of communicable and non-communicable 
diseases is equal that of an undersea earthquake, then the indirect cost to society in the 
developing world due to counterfeiting infiltration is similar to an oncoming tsunami of 
unanticipated financial obligations and unfunded liabilities. 
 
The economic cost of counterfeit in general affect countries in a number of ways. First, 
industries have direct competition with counterfeiters by loss in sales. Second, 
counterfeiting sometimes prevent entry of producers with genuine products. Third, 
consumers are deceived by believing they bought a genuine product and sometimes 
blames the manufacturer when the product fails, creating a loss of goodwill. Furthermore, 
the loss of goodwill threatens companies that want their brands associated with quality 
and exclusivity. Fifth, countries suffer because foreign producers with reputable brand 
are reluctant to manufacture their products where counterfeiting is high because they 





from foreign products (OECD, 1998). The economic impact can result in loss of sales for 
companies and tax revenue for governments (OECD, 2007). Furthermore, if products 
from countries gain a reputation of being counterfeited, this may decrease export and 
perhaps lead to job losses and loss of foreign exchange (OECD, 1998).  
 
2.6 The Pharmaceutical Supply Chain 
The Kaiser Foundation defines the pharmaceutical supply chain as “….means through 
which prescription medicines are delivered to patients. Pharmaceuticals originated in 
manufacturing sites are transferred to wholesale distributors; stocked at retail, mail-order, 
and other types of pharmacies; subject to price negotiations and processed through 
quality and utilization management screens by pharmacy benefit management companies 
(Pumas); dispensed by pharmacies; and ultimately delivered to and taken by patients.”  
 
The Institute of Logistics describes the pharmaceutical supply chain as “…the sourcing of 
active and inactive ingredients for approved products. Dosages are formulated and 
packed into various configurations. Products flow through company warehouses, 











The pharmaceutical supply chain (PSC) comprises of raw material suppliers, active 
pharmaceutical ingredients producers, finished dosage manufacturers, packagers, 
wholesalers, distributors, clinics, pharmacies, and finally, patients (Figure 6).  
Raw materials are active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) and excipients. International 
Conference on Harmonization (ICH) ICH Q7A defined “active pharmaceutical 
ingredients” (API) as: 
“any substance or mixture of substances intended to be used in the manufacture of 
a drug product and that, when used in the production of a drug, becomes an active 
ingredient in the drug product. Such substances are intended to furnish 
pharmacological activity or other direct effect in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, 






API’s are crucial for formulation of medicines product, hence, it is an essential element 
for the manufacturing of the final drug product (FDP).  
 
United States Pharmacopeia (USP) defines “excipients” as: 
“components of a finished drug product other than the active pharmaceutical 
ingredient (API) and are added during formulation for a specific purpose. 
Although listed as inactive ingredients by FDA, excipients generally have well-
defined functions in a drug product. As with active ingredients, they may be small 
molecule or complex and may vary in terms of degree of characterization. They 
may be chemically synthesized or may be either natural source or biotechnology-
derived (recombinant). In contrast to active ingredients, minor components of an 
excipient may have significant impact on its pharmaceutical performance. 
Depending on the intended use, an excipient in a drug product may be an active 
ingredient in another drug product.” 
 
Finished dosage manufacturers (FDM) utilize the API and excipient components to 
produce a final product. At this stage in the supply chain, the FDM deliver products to 
licensed wholesale distributors, who then deliver products to pharmacies or hospitals. 
This flow of products from the FDM side was the status quo in earlier times; nowadays, 
this model is quite different. Globalization has shifted traditional pharmaceutical business 
models. 
 
The distribution model today is different because primary wholesalers distribute to 
secondary wholesalers or to repackagers. Additionally, secondary wholesalers distribute 
to hospitals or pharmacies and repackagers (Enyinda et al, 2009). “The secondary 
distribution channel is the movement of products purchased from an authorized 
distributor, or source other than the manufacturer, to another intermediary. These 






The secondary distribution channel represents one method for the infiltration of 
counterfeit or otherwise adulterated drugs into the legitimate supply chain. Within the 
secondary distribution channel, drugs often change hands many times before reaching the 
provider or the end user.  
 
The FDA regulates finished dosage manufacturers (FDM); however, the wholesalers 
receive a license from state boards of pharmacy (BOPs) and state department of health 
and BOPs enforces other regulations. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is 
responsible for regulating the supply chain for manufacturing, wholesale, prescription 
and pharmacies that handle controlled substances (e.g. narcotics) (Zimmerman, 2006). 
Zimmerman stated that problems of counterfeit arise when wholesalers do not hold a 
DEA registration. This creates a supply chain risk in that no authority (federal or state) 
may ever inspect the wholesaler. Counterfeit cases in the past have entered the legitimate 
supply chain because of this factor. 
 
2.7 Drug Counterfeit Attributes 
Sodipo (1997) provides a list of attributes for drug counterfeiting that was a part of 
broader research from the TRIPS (Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 






These attributes include: 
 
• Profit 
• Cheap to Copy 
• Easy to Copy 
• Unsatisfied market demands 
• Difficulties of detection and proof 
• Non-deterrent laws and lacunae in laws 
• Poor government policies 
• Location of countries- production 
 
The Organization for Economic Co-Operation (OECD) published a report on drivers for 
counterfeit and pirate activities in 2007. In this report, OECD grouped the driving factors 
by the categories: market characteristics, product characteristics, product, distribution, 
and technology, consumer characteristics, and institutional characteristics. Each category 










           Table 2: Driving Factors 
Supply Chain Characteristics Demand Characteristics 
Market Characteristics Product Characteristics 
 
High Unit Profitability 
Large potential market size 




Acceptable perceived quality 
Ability to conceal status 
Product, Distribution, and 
Technology Consumer Characteristics 
Moderate need for investments 
 Moderate technology requirements 
Unproblematic distribution sales 
High ability to conceal operations 
Easy to deceive consumers 
 
 
No Health concerns  
No Safety concerns 
Personal budget constraints 
Low regard for IPR 
 
 
Institutional Characteristics Institutional Characteristics 
Low risk of discovery 
 Legal and regulatory framework  
 Weak Enforcement 
 Non-deterrent penalties 
Low risk of discovery and prosecution 
 Weak or no penalties 
 Availability and ease of acquisition 
Socio-economic factors 
 
Although the driving factors are presented from both a supply and demand perspectives; 
the decisions of what to produce and what markets to target are driven by market 
characteristics, technological and logical consideration, and institutions. Specifically, 
market potential can be coupled to market characteristics; market exploitation can be 
coupled to production, distribution, and technology; and lastly, market risk to institutional 






2.7.1 Market Characteristics 
Market characteristics comprise of unit profitability, market size, and brand power. One 
of the driving forces behind counterfeiting is size of the market tied to unit profitability. 
The higher the potential for unit profitability, the higher the incentive for the product to 
be counterfeited. Unit profitability is determined by the cost of producing the product 
relative to price of product (Staake & Fleish, 2010 & OECD, 2007).   
 
The market size is also an essential component of market characteristics. The larger the 
market size for a product (e.g., pharmaceutical product), the larger the profitability for 
counterfeiters. For example, larger customers based are tied to larger customer base for 
infringing goods (Wertheimer & Wang, 2012 & OECD, 2007). 
 
Branded product is highly correlated to profitability and market size. For example, the 
popular brand name drug Lipitor used to treat cholesterol offers a high unit of 
profitability; and has a higher risk of counterfeiting. Brand name products or drugs may 
be more profitable relative to generic products and have a higher price premium due to 
the market size (OECD, 2007). 
 
2.7.2 Production, Logistics, and Technology 
With access to modern production facilities, counterfeiters are greatly reaping the 
benefits of producing fake products and raking in high profits (Staake & Fleish, 2010). 
For counterfeiter to enter the market, the technology and production capacity must be 





drug-trafficking organizations to bypass customs and countries that, conduct few 
inspections and have not been a significant source of counterfeit production. By doing 
this, they avoid being on the radar of customs officials. In addition, for countries where 
the intellectual property rights are strictly enforced, the postal services become the 
popular distribution channel.  
 
2.7.3 Institutional Characteristics 
The World Health Organization (WHO) stated that only 30 % of their members have 
laws and regulation to effectively combat counterfeit drugs (WHO, 2011). With limited 
resources for enforcement activities, the value of laws and regulations for the rights 
holder is diminished (OECD, 2007). The lack of or absent of a strong and structured 
regulatory system results in criminals producing counterfeits product at alarming rates.  
 
This creates a permeable drug supply chain, counterfeits drugs go undetected, and drug 
counterfeiters escape with little or no punishment (Wertheimer & Wang, 2012). From the 
counterfeiter’s perspective, the main concern is the ability to conceal operations. If the 
consequences or penalties are small, then the risk of discovery may have little 







2.8 Related Works  
Spink (2009) presented a framework to determine product risk ranking that is built on 
five pillars: counterfeit-history; counterfeit ability; counterfeit-attractiveness; counterfeit-
hurdles; and market-profile. His framework utilized the vetted factors discussed in OECD 
work done in 2007 (Spink, 2009). He presented a methodology to determine the product 
risk rank utilizing the five pillars with sub-risk factors discussed in the sections above. In 
addition, his model covers both the demand and supply factors and utilized 
qualitative/subjective approach for quantifying the product risk. His approach does not 
address factors that are highly correlated nor discuss the factors importance. Secondly, 
from a resource perspective, his model does not provide risk-stratification level; therefore 
his approach can become problematic when large sets of products are analyzed. 
 
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA, 2013) published a comprehensive list of 
attributes to target potential counterfeit drugs: 
• Drugs history of counterfeiting 
• Drugs Price 
• Drugs Volume 
• Drug Dosage form 
• Drug Clinical Use; and  






It is important to note that the FDA and OECD provide us with a comprehensive list of 
factors to consider when thinking about product counterfeit risk, however, no consensus 
on how to implement these criteria. 
 
Trent & Moyer (2013) presented a qualitative risk assessment framework for determining 
the risk of product counterfeiting. Their perspective includes questions that are tied to 
severity and likelihood. For example, questions pertaining to severity include: 
• Who will use the product? 
• What is the intended duration of uses for the product? 
• Will the product be implanted, infused, injected, or ingested? 
• Will a health care professional administer the product or will the patient use the 
product himself/herself? 
• What would happen if a product with no therapeutic benefit or active ingredient 
were used? 
• Does the product require special handling such as special temperature or humidity 
controls? 
For revenue and brand reputation from counterfeiters, questions include: 
• What is the annual revenue for the product or where in your portfolio of products 
does this product fit in terms of revenue? 
• Is this product a flagship brand for the company? 
For likelihood of counterfeiting, questions include: 
• Have there been any previous incidents of confirmed or suspected counterfeiting 





• If the product is still in development and no market history is available, have 
similar or competitor products ever been targeted by counterfeiters? 
• Have counterfeits actively been looked for in the marketplace or on the internet? 
• Have market surveys been conducted or targeted buyers in high risk regions or 
from suspicious retailers? 
• Has the customer complaint history been checked for potential 
counterfeit…product? 
• Are there branded competitors in the marketplace or is the product the only one in 
its class? 
• If there are competitors, where does the product fit in terms of market share and 
pricing? 
While these questions are extremely useful for conducting individual product risk 
assessments, it should be noted that it could be coupled with the supply characteristics 







2.9 Counterfeiting in Other Industries 
2.9.1 Perfume Industry 
Most of counterfeit products are sold on the grey market through street traders and 
smaller shops at affordable prices. Consumers are not aware they are fakes and the 
product is lower quality. Oftentimes, traders present that the goods are stolen to deceive 
consumers that they are real. Three types of counterfeits perfumes: reasonable packaging, 
look-alikes but not identical, and fakes claiming false origin. Industry estimated 1 to 2 
percent of their annual review is spent combating the illicit trade (OECD, 1998). 
 
2.9.2 Aircraft Industry 
The aerospace sector experienced a growth of counterfeit parts, specifically, aerospace 
electronics. The industry in 2005 experienced 3,300 incidents/occurrences and more than 
8,000 incidents/occurrences in 2008 (AIA, 2011). These incidents may adversely affect 
the supply chain. Furthermore, effects may include: 
• Government 
o National security or civilian safety issues 
o Cost of enforcements 
o Lost tax revenue due to illegals sales of counterfeit parts 
• Industry 
o Costs to mitigate risk 
o Costs to replace failed parts 
o Lost sales 






o Cost when products fail due to lower quality and reliability of counterfeit 
parts 
o Potential Safety Concerns. 
 
Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) identified long life cycle, diminishing 
manufacturing sources, and material shortages as reasons for counterfeiting. For example, 
B-52 program went into service 1955 with an anticipated retirement date of 2040. Several 
changes occurred during the program life cycle; these include technologies for electronic 
components; design and support functions; software changes; and manufacturing process 
changes. Therefore, supporting these changes throughout their lifecycle requires parts 
that may no longer be available from the original manufacture. Thus, when parts are 
acquired from different distributor channels other than authorized original manufacturer- 








Publications are limited on pharmaceutical counterfeit risk factors and their importance 
on drug counterfeiting. The few that are published provide us with a list of potential risk 
factors that experts will further evaluate for importance and applicability to drug 
counterfeiting. None of these published works has empirically explained the factors 
importance on drug counterfeiting or provided us with quantitative framework for 






Chapter 3: Counterfeit Attributes Selection and Analysis 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The business of pharmaceutical drug counterfeiting is lucrative but counterfeiters risk 
severe financial and legal penalties if caught. Counterfeiters survey the pharmaceutical 
drug supply chain to determine suitable point(s) to introduce adulterated products into the 
legitimate drug supply chain. As a result, regulators, representatives of pharmaceutical 
companies, drug manufactures, wholesale and retail drug suppliers and other legitimate 
stakeholders have a difficult task to prevent counterfeits from entering the legitimate drug 
supply chain.   
 
Case studies and literature reviews were analyzed to determine the counterfeit attributes 
that provide a deep understanding of drug counterfeiting and are presumed good 
indicators of counterfeiting. Analysis identified ten attributes that are commonly 
mentioned in literature or evident in case studies as counterfeit indicators. These 
attributes are (1) country of origin (region), (2) product location, (3) product type, (4) 
product counterfeit history, (5) volume, (6) drug price, (7) drug shortage, (8) drug class, 
(9) medication class and (10) product complexity. 
 
Figure 7 shows an overview of the work presented in this chapter. Following the 
identification of attributes from the literature and counterfeiting case studies, experts 





counterfeiting. The attributes provided by Experts and those identified in the literature 
were consolidated and discussed in another round of elicitation with Experts. 
  
During this discussion, Experts were asked to use their knowledge and experience of the 
pharmaceutical drug supply chain to provide input for the development of a conceptual 
model of the relationship between counterfeit attributes and their influence on 
counterfeiting. The resulting conceptual model, driven by both expert judgment and 
meta-analysis of the literature review, provides an explanation of the critical attributes 
that impact drug counterfeiting. In addition, Experts were asked to modify and validate 
the Counterfeit conceptual model. A discussion of each attribute and the Counterfeit 
conceptual model follows in Section 3.3 and 3.2, respectively.   
 






3.2 Counterfeit Attribute Identification and Expert Elicitations 
Counterfeited products continue to surface within the legitimate drug supply. Regulators 
and the pharmaceutical industry use arguments of conjecture to determine the necessary 
course of action to try to mitigate counterfeits, rather than sound science and robust 
scientific tools and techniques. This is due, in part, to the vast landscape and limited 
knowledge of the pharmaceutical supply chain, and the limited published data in almost 
every aspect. As a result, expert elicitation (EE) is needed and utilized to supplement the 
knowledge gaps. According to Forrester (2005), expert elicitation is often used in 
scenarios that involve significant uncertainty and can have a significant effect on risk. 
Booker and Moyer (1990) discussed the benefits of EE. First, ideal for recognizing 
problem structured; and second, EE can be used to provide quantitative estimates.  
 
3.2.1 Experts Definition and Experts 
Several authors (Table 3) published studies indicating what qualifies an individual as an 
Expert. The U.S. Supreme Court in Daubert vs. Dow Pharmaceuticals, classifies legal 
experts in Federal Rule of Evidence 702 as individuals with scientific, technical, skill, 
experience, training, or education that will assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact at issue (Penrod et al. 1995).  Forrester (2005) determined 
the quality of expert performance in the field of medicine is based on the following 





expertise, as well as institution type, average level of formal education, event frequency, 
and average year of experience.  
  
Table 3 : List of Expert Definition (Forrester, 2005) 
 
 
3.2.2 Expert Panel Size 
The number of experts in the panel is still a widely discussed and researched problem 
today. Hogarth (1978) model suggested 6-10 experts is sufficient and Ashton and Ashton 
(1985) empirical work showed that between three and six experts lead to, high accuracy 
level and reported that using four experts reduced the error by an estimated 3.5%. Shirazi 
(2009) researched expert panel accuracy and determined that an expert panel of two 
improve the accuracy of estimates by 50% and selecting more than two experts improve 
the accuracy of estimates by more than 60 %. Their research further stated that increasing 





Blashfiled (1978) explained that increasing expert panel from 1 to 3 improves the 
accuracy of forecasting. They recommended an expert panel ranging 5 to 9.  
 
 3.2.3 Experts Selection 
A total of eight experts were selected and interviewed to identify and validate the 
attributes that serve as good indicators of drug counterfeiting, along with their influences. 
Experts in this research were used for three primary reasons. First, to validate the factors 
identified from literature to determine their importance in being utilized in a decision 
model. Second, to add new factors that were not identified in literature. Third, to present 
an influence diagram showing the causal structure that could be used for qualitative 
validation.  
 
In this research, experts were selected based on their years of experience and knowledge 
in the field of product development, manufacturing, and supply chain best practices (e.g., 
mitigating counterfeiting). Each expert had a minimum of five years of healthcare and 
pharmaceutical experience. They also had relevant knowledge of supply chain or product 
development. Furthermore, some of the selected experts conducted research in the area in 
drug development, and worked in brand protection. All experts had prior experience 
working on expert elicitation studies. Table 4 represents a summary of the qualification 







  Table 4: Expert Panel 
Expert 
Years of 
Experience Degree(s) Industry 
1 13+ Regulatory Science, PhD HealthCare 
2 20 + MPH, PhD HealthCare 
3 7 + Regulatory Science, MBA Pharmaceutical 
4 10 Biochemistry, MPH HealthCare 
5 13 
Molecular Biology, MS, 
MBA Pharmaceutical 
6 8 + MS HealthCare 
7 16+ MD, PhD, MPH HealthCare/Academia 
8 30+ PhD HealthCare/Academia 
 
 
3.2.4 Elicitation Process 
During the interviews, each expert was asked to validate identified counterfeit attributes 
as well as any new attribute that may enhance the understanding of drug counterfeiting. 
In addition, each expert was asked to describe his or her understanding of counterfeit 
drugs and how counterfeit drugs may affect consumers. They were also asked to provide 
a simple diagram or simply list the risk attributes and other factors that a supply chain 
risk manager (SCRM) would use for screening drug products at greatest risk of 
counterfeiting (see survey instrument in Appendix A).  This approach is adapted from 
Kazemi (2011) dissertation research work. 
 
After discussing risk factors with each individual experts, a conceptual (or influence 
diagram) counterfeit model was presented to them for their review and discussion. This 
phase of the survey process allowed experts to analyze the risk factors that were built 





a qualitative structure to experts allowed us to come to a consensus model after much 
discussions and revisions to the model.  
 
The conceptual counterfeit model, shown in Figure 8, represents the culmination of all 
the conceptual models previously provided by experts, and review of literature. This 
model also resulted from a consensus among experts, following many discussions and 
revisions to the model. Parameters were deleted and added as well as influences were 
changed to reflect relationship from parent to child nodes. 
 
 Within an influence diagram, a parent node is closer to the root node on the same branch, 
while a child node is a step lower in hierarchy than the parent node on the same branch. 
For example, in Figure 8, the Probability of Counterfeiting is the root node, Potential 
Product Shortages is a parent node with Material Shortages and Manufacturing Issues 
being child nodes. Each expert was asked to rate this qualitative model on a scale from 0 
to 100 for model accuracy and to validate the model for Completeness, Accuracy and 












Completeness: The following questions were asked of each expert: From your 
perspective, to what extent does this model capture all important and relevant phenomena 
for the particular problem under study? On a scale 0 to 100, “0” corresponds to a model 
that does not include some important and relevant details, whereas “100” corresponds to 
a model that includes all the details that are considered important. 
 
Accuracy: The following questions were asked of each expert: From your perspective, 
how accurately or realistically does the model depict important facts that predict the risk 
of pharmaceutical being counterfeited? On a scale from 0 to 100, “0” corresponds to a 
model that is unrealistic or inaccurate, while “100” corresponds to a model is realistic and 
accurate. 
 
Ease of Understanding: The following questions were asked of each expert: From your 
perspective, how easy it is to understand the overall logic of the model? On a scale from 
0 to 100, “0” corresponds to a model that is difficult to follow, while “100” corresponds 
to a model that is readily understandable. 
 
Table 5 summarizes the responses of Experts to the three questions asked regarding 







Table 5: Expert Qualitative Validation of Counterfeit Factors and Concept Model 
Expert Completeness Accuracy 
Ease of 
Understanding 
1 95 90 90 
2 90 >80 90 
3 80 85 90 
4 90 85 90 
5 90 90 90 
6 90 >90 95 
 
Experts agreed that the conceptual model presented is a good representation of causal 
network to detect the likelihood of product counterfeit and can be utilized for risk 
mitigation planning. They also added that no model is perfect which is reflected in their 
responses under completeness and accuracy; and that there is always uncertainty when 
modeling (see Figure 8). Each expert provided risk attributes that were unique to the 
model development. No single expert listed all the factors that were the most important; 
however, there were some overlaps between experts (i.e.: Expert I- Geographic and Cost; 







3.3 Analysis of Counterfeit Attributes 
3.3.1 Country of Origin (Region) 
Experts unanimously agreed that country of origin for the final production of finished 
dosage form (FDF) products is of great importance to the probability of Counterfeiting. A 
report from the Pew Health Group (PEW, 2011) also supports this finding. The report 
states that “geography and complexity of drug manufacturing have changed dramatically 
during recent decades, presenting new challenges to oversight and increasing risk that 
substandard drugs may reach patients.” Manufacturing of pharmaceutical products is no 
longer within a country; it extends beyond country borders and now becoming a global 
system. Excipients can be manufactured in one country, the active ingredients in second 
country, and the FDF in a third country. 
 
According to PEW, global revenues for pharmaceutical contract manufacturing is on the 
rise. The estimated revenues in 2009 for finished drug were approximately $22.4 billion, 
and are projected to increase to $39.6 billion in 2014 (see Figure 9). As the projection of 
foreign manufacturers increase, so does the risk of drug counterfeiting. This is especially 
true for developing countries that have weak regulatory systems, and loopholes in laws 








Figure 9 : Outsourced Finished Dosage Form Manufacturing Revenue: Growth by Region 
Worldwide (PEW, 2011) 
 
Country of origin plays a critical role for screening and detection of potential counterfeit 
drugs in the US pharmaceutical supply chain (Reggie, 2007). Higher rates of counterfeit 
incidents are found in Asia, Latin American, and Europe (see Figure 10). Furthermore, 
the majority of drugs that are imported to the United States are from these countries that 
are experiencing high rates of counterfeit incidents (see Figure 11). Inadequate drug 
regulations, high corruption indexes, as well as lax penal sanctions are incentives for 
counterfeiters to enter the market to produce products that are potentially lethal to 
consumers. Counterfeiters represent both financially motivated criminal entities and 
terrorism groups. Criminals are in for the enormous turnover and huge profit margin and 
see counterfeiting business as a lucrative way to get a steady flow of money. For them it 
is less risk, high profits, and absurd penalties when compared with other criminal 
activities such as marketing narcotics (Obi-Eyisi & Wertheimer, 2012). Figure 12 depicts 
an influence diagram of the sub-factors of country of origin that increases the likelihood 
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The lack of an official supply chain in developing countries and open markets present a 
huge risk not only to individuals who live within these countries but also consumers 
worldwide. No systematic structure for distributing drug allows intermediaries to become 
involved in the distribution of pharmaceutical products. This creates numerous 










3.3.2 Product Location 
Product Location represents the locations that drug manufacturing and distribution 
progress within the pharmaceutical supply chain. Typically, the chain begins at the raw 
materials sourcing locations, then they move through the various types of manufacturing 
locations, and finally to the distribution and dispensing locations. The location of the 
drug product in the supply chain is critical in aiding decision makers in determining the 
likelihood of and how to identify possible counterfeit. Several domain experts 
interviewed in this research, and evidence in the literature affirmed that it is easier to 
distribute and access both prescription and over-the-counter (OTC) drugs over the 
internet. The vast and dynamic domain of the internet creates a challenging environment 
for regulators to find and prosecute drug counterfeiters, as well as to effectively educate 
consumers about counterfeiting risks. Counterfeits use the internet to market their illegal 
businesses of selling fake and bad drugs to consumers (Pfizer, 2012). According to 
Pfizer, the rise of counterfeits can be attributed to other factors such as under-regulated 
wholesalers and repackagers and the small penalties counterfeiters may face. 
 
The business model of drug counterfeiters requires vigilance over all the major entities in 
the drug supply chain (see Figures 13 and 14). Drug counterfeiters infiltrate legitimate 
entities and fake drugs to now reach innocent consumers. There are varying degrees of 
counterfeit risks at the different drug outlets. Hospitals, online entities, clinics, and 
pharmacies are among the most common pharmaceutical drug outlets. Individual patients 
are most at risk of buying counterfeit drugs from internet retail outlets than private 





from distributors or wholesalers; there is, however, a small likelihood that counterfeit 
drugs may end up at these locations.  
 
 










The United States General Accountability (GAO) report on internet pharmacies 
discovered serious health risks associated with purchasing prescription drugs over the 
internet. There is sufficient evidence that location of product is important for screening 
and detection of potential counterfeit drugs. Table 6 summarizes a GAO study of 90 
prescription drugs ordered and samples received from internet pharmacies. Of the 68 
samples received, 45 where obtained without a prescription. Also, it should be noted that 
four of 68 samples were positively identified as counterfeits. Although the sample 
population is relatively small, 6% being counterfeited is still alarming, when considering 
the potential consequences of those adulterated drugs are considered. 
    
 









To strengthen the argument that location of product is important especially when the 
consumer population is easily exposed to buying bad drugs over the internet, GAO stated,  
 
“Internet pharmacies pose challenges for regulators. State boards of pharmacy in 
many states have reported difficulty identifying Internet pharmacies located 
outside of their borders and have limited ability and authority to investigate and 
act against pharmacies that do not comply with state pharmacy laws when they 
are identified. In 2000, nearly half of the state boards had identified consumer 
complaints against Internet pharmacies or reported problems with Internet 
pharmacies not complying with state pharmacy laws.” 
 
 Table 7 depicts the issues and risk discovered from ordering prescription drugs over 
internet pharmacies.  
 
     Table 7: Observed Problems with Prescription Drugs Ordered (GAO, 2004) 
Pharmacy Location Canada Other Foreign U.S. 
No pharmacy label with 
instructions for use  
(23 samples) 
























Improperly shipped or 
dispensed (4 samples) 










Damaged packaging  
(5 samples) 










Pharmacy Location Canada Other Foreign U.S. 
markets (35 samples) Combivir (3) 
Crixivan (3) 












Counterfeit or otherwise 
not comparable to product 
ordered (4 samples) 







3.3.3 Type of Product 
Experts unanimously agreed that the Type of Product attribute is an important indicator 
of potential drug counterfeiting. High priced medicines such as anti-cancer and HIV 
drugs are some of the products at risk of being counterfeited because of the market 
demand (WHO, 2009). Counterfeiters are well aware of market demand and profitability 
of these drugs and are willing to enter the market to make a quick profit. Additional 
examples of counterfeit pharmaceutical drugs noted by the World Health Organization 
(WHO) are shown in Table 8. Liang (2006) mentioned that fake Lipitor and Viagra, two 
common drugs used to treat cholesterol and sexual dysfunction, respectively, are making 








Table 8 : WHO Examples of Spurious/falsely-labeled/falsified/counterfeit (SFFC) Medicines   
 
 
In February of 2012, the Intercontinental Marketing Services (IMS) Institute published 
their top-line market data on top therapeutic classes by U.S. spending (see Figure 15). 
Commonly, counterfeited drug products such as lipid regulators, anti-diabetic and 



























Figure 15 : Top Therapeutic Classes by U.S. Spending 
 
 
It is worth mentioning that IMS did not publish information on OTC products; however, 
their information clearly depicted strong correlations between brand-name products and 
cost.  
 
3.3.4 Product Counterfeit History 
A pharmaceutical drug product counterfeit history is an important attribute for indicating 
the likelihood of counterfeiting. Experts agreed that previously counterfeited product is a 
strong indicator of risk of product counterfeiting- collectively stating that it is always 
important to do initial analysis to determine what has or has not been counterfeited is 
essential step in risk identification of pharmaceutical products. Several authors in the 
literature stress the importance of counterfeit history as a predictive factor for the 





listed three steps in evaluating counterfeit magnitude and identification of goods that 
were counterfeited or pirated. Decision makers (DM) often encounter challenges with the 
availability of the resources needed to identify potential counterfeits in a given inventory. 
The incorporation of the product counterfeit history into the decision making process can 
aid in the identification of potential counterfeited drugs. There is one caveat to consider, 
when using this parameter as part of the decision-making process; products that have no 
previous counterfeit history do not necessarily indicate that they have lower risk of being 
counterfeited (Spink, 2009).  
 
3.3.5 Market Demand 
In order to understand the market demand for pharmaceutical drugs, it is important to 
know the market definition. Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2005) define the market as “the 
collection of buyers and sellers that, through their actual or potential interactions, 
determine the price of a product or set of products.” In the pharmaceutical products 
market, the buyers are the pharmacies, the hospitals, and the consumers, etc; the sellers 
are the big pharmaceutical companies, the primary and secondary wholesalers and a 
number of other entities. The market as a whole is more than an industry; it is a collection 
of firms that sells the same or similar products (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2005).   
 
In the case of market demand from a product perspective, it is the demand for a particular 







Figure 16 : Supply and Demand Curve (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supply_and_demand) 
 
 
In the case of drug counterfeiting, the markets for some types of pharmaceutical products 
are dissatisfied (Spink, 2009). This environment of unfulfilled demand for products and 
potentially high profits, create opportunities for counterfeiters to enter the market to 
satisfy these demands. Experts agreed that market demand is a good indicator for a 
product’s risk of counterfeiting. Specifically, experts discussed that this important 
characteristic when coupling to product unit cost and potential profitability. 
Counterfeiters typically target products that have high profits, larger market, and high 
demand.  
 
The market demand for top brand name and patented drug products are extremely high as 
indicated in the IMS Health data (see Figure 17). Miller and Duggan (2010) listed 





the top counterfeited products. Correlating their studies with IMS health data; they found 
that Lipitor, the number one block-buster cholesterol medication excels in sales volume 











































































































































Figure 17 : Top U.S Pharmaceutical Products by Spending US$ in Billons 
 
While the demand for brand-name and patented drugs may be higher than that of generic 
drugs; it does not hinder counterfeiters from trying to enter the market. Inksure 
Technologies made the best possible case why generic products should be considered in 
the of risk model as do some of the experts in this research. Inksure stated the demand for 
generic drugs is increasing market share. He also emphasized that many of the popular 
brand-name drugs are about to reach their patent expiration date or have expired, thus 
creating new markets for manufacturers to make and sell. The estimated value of the 
generic market is projected to be around US$ 168.7 billon according to Inksure. With 
these increases in both demands and profits, counterfeiters are strategically entering the 






3.3.6 Drug Price 
Economic theory determines the price of product and the level of production at which 
marginal revenues equals marginal costs (OECD, 2008). Figure 18 depicts the scenario in 
which prices of genuine products are determined:  
 
 
Figure 18 : Determining Price of Genuine Products (OECD, 2008) 
Note (taken from OECD, 2008): Demand is depicted by a downward sloping curve denoted D. The price p* 
is set where the marginal revenue equals the marginal cost (MR=MC) resulting in a market size q*. 
 
 
The drug price attribute will help supply chain managers (SCM’s) determine which 
products are more at risk of being counterfeited. As mentioned previously, it is important 
to understand price setting concept because counterfeiters are competing with legitimate 
drug owners, especially in cases where the products are in high demand and there are 
large profit margins. Experts agreed that drug price is another important attribute to 





pharmaceutical drugs pertaining to price differentials. People will seek cheaper drugs if a 
market exists, especially unregulated markets.  Spink (2009) and FDA (2013) presented 
in their studies that drug price is an important attribute for products at greater risk of 
being counterfeited. However, price, if measured alone is not a key indicator for 
predicting the risk of drug counterfeiting. A drug counterfeiter considers a number of 
factors when determining which drugs to counterfeit.  For example, a drug with high 
demand and low cost is profitable to a counterfeiter after factoring in the volume concept 
along with price  
 
3.3.7 Drug Shortage 
According to the University of Utah Drug Information Service (UUDIS), an organization 
that partners with the American Society of Health System Pharmacists (ASHSP) to track 
nationwide drug shortages in the US, a drug shortage occurs when “total supply does not 
meet demand for a drug on a nationwide or regional basis for a period of time that 
necessitates changing the practice of treating the patient.” Some of the experts in this 
study believe drug shortage could be a useful attribute to include in the counterfeit model 
and stated it is useful to watch market trends for potential material shortage(s) that could 
impact the final product(s) for distribution. Previous studies identified earlier in this 
dissertation did not address the concept of product [drug] shortage as an attribute that 







“Shortages of some injectable cancer drugs have created an opening for 
dangerous unapproved versions of Roche Holding AG (ROG)’s Herceptin and 
Amgen Inc. (AMGN)’s Neupogen to be sold to clinics…” 
 
Counterfeiting operations are very informed about product statistics and often try to 
capitalize on the market to sell their adulterated products during times of shortages 
caused by insufficient manufacturing output to meet the demand (Karalias, 2010). While 
product shortages are the realized event at the end of the supply chain; it can stem from 
many different sources upstream or downstream in the supply chain. According to the 
FDA (2011), the primary reasons for shortages were problems at the manufacturing 
facility (43%), delays in manufacturing or shipping (15%) and active pharmaceutical 
ingredient shortages (10%); and manufacturing quality problems such as findings of glass 
shards, metal filings, and fungal or other contamination in products.  
 
Drug shortages may force providers to buy drugs from the gray market and from 
distribution channels that are not authorized by the manufacturer to distribute or sell their 
products. In the gray market, suppliers typically get small quantities of drugs that are in 
shortage and sell them at an inflated price. Oftentimes, it is difficult to determine the 
source of drug products in the gray market. As a result, the drug safety and efficacy can 
become compromised. Consumers may not get the therapeutic treatment from the drug, 
and as a result, may experience adverse events or receive poor outcome (GAO, 2011).  
 
Information on drug shortages or the likelihood of product shortages can be found 
through several avenues such as the ASHP and the Food and Drug Administration 





shortage. In addition, this information is readily available to SCRM’s to retrieve from 
both entities websites. SCRM’s can quickly assess the risk of drug counterfeit through 
look-up of drug in questions.  
  
3.3.8 Product Complexity  
Product complexity signifies the ease at which a product can be cheaply manufactured or 
copied. Counterfeiters, like the legitimate manufacturers, are in the business to make a 
profit; therefore, they target products that are easy to copy and have low risk of detection. 
For example, counterfeiters are unlikely to attempt the counterfeiting of a biologic 
vaccine product. The process to make this and similar products require complex 
manufacturing techniques, very stable environments and logistic planning. This variable 
characterizes the product’s technological and innovative requirements to manufacture and 
introduce the drug products into the legitimate supply chain. Experts agreed product 
complexity is a useful variable to measure if a product is at risk of counterfeiting. For 
example, one expert mentioned that it is difficult to counterfeit biological products 
because the process to manufacture them is highly complex as well as the cost to 
manufacture them is high.  
 
Pharmaceutical Inspection Convention Pharmaceutical Inspection Co-Operation Scheme 
(PIC/S) is an organization comprised of several health regulatory authorities harmonized 






1) In general, the greater the number of subcomponents that make up any one 
product package, the greater the risk to more product complexity. For 
example, a pack of an injectable product may have 4 components; 
2) Products requiring special storage and distribution : (e.g., cold chain products, 
short-shelf products such as radiopharmaceuticals can be complex to manage) 
 
Figure 19 illustrates the elements that supply chain risk managers (SCRMs) can use to 
determine product complexity. These elements include accounting for the ease to 
manufacturing the products, the technological needs to produce the products, distribution 
challenges, sales, and as well as, the ability of the product to remain undetected within 
the drug supply chain, and ability to conceal operations and easiness to deceive 
consumers (OECD, 2007a). 
 
 






While most counterfeiters are not thinking about value (e.g., patient safety, public health 
risk), they do think about cost. Highly profitable products (e.g., oncology drugs), often 




In summary, through literature reviews, case studies, and expert elicitations we were able 
to identify critical counterfeit attributes that can be utilized in a decision model for drug 
prioritization pertaining to counterfeiting. In addition, we developed a conceptual model 
that be utilized to explain the relationship between the attributes and drug counterfeit. 
The conceptual model derived both from experts and literatures provide us with an initial 






Chapter 4: Data Collection and Descriptive Analysis 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarizes the data collection methodology and the descriptive statistics of 
the data collected from published case studies and literature. 
4.2 Data Uncertainty  
Gathering data on drug counterfeiting is limited. In order to do data analysis on the 
counterfeit attributes identified in this study, data had to be collected from publically 
available sources described in this chapter. Assumptions were made to gather data on the 
attributes units (e.g., average price per unit). Therefore, rounding, could introduce error 
into the analysis by taking averages. Thus, based on the assumptions, uncertainties could 
have been introduced into the analysis. Other sources of data uncertainties can arise from 
the following: (1) errors made during documenting information from the primary sources; 
(2) misinterpretation of the data; and (3) errors from published materials (Blair et al., 
2013).   
4.3 Data Collection 
Information pertaining to drug counterfeiting is limited and scattered. Structured data for 
analysis is non-existent, and it is a sounding theme from literature and regulatory 
agencies around the globe. Structured data is considered information with a high degree 
of organization and defined fields (e.g., attribute names, data types etc.). Since structured 





structured framework to collect meaningful data and do descriptive analysis. The process 
is depicted in Figure 20. First, literature reviews was conducted to determine a set of 
counterfeit attributes. Second, experts were used to validate the usefulness of these 
counterfeit attributes in a risk model (or decision model) as well as potential of new 
attributes to be included. Third, each attribute is defined and unit of measure is defined. 
For example, price of drug is measured by average unit cost in dollars and volume is 
measured in number of units sold. Fourth, data is collected and entered in structured 
format for analysis. 
 
 








Several data sources were utilized to create the structured pharmaceutical counterfeit data 
analysis table. Published case studies, Counterfeit Drug Incidence Encyclopedia (CDIE), 
The Red Book, World Health Organization (WHO) and IMS Health provided relevant 
variable information that was utilized to form the foundation of the counterfeit dataset. 
Each data source provided different information on a specific counterfeit drug (see Table 
4.1).  
 
Published case studies consisted of publicly available information on drug counterfeiting. 
Information was extracted from government agencies publications (both United States 
and Foreign Regulatory Bodies), research journals, as well as Non-Profit Organizations 
(PEW and PSI), and the World Health Organization (WHO).  
 
The Counterfeit Drug Incident Encyclopedia (CDIE) documents counterfeit incidents in 
the legitimate supply chain worldwide. CDIE provides high level analysis on incidents, 
for example, incident location, where in the legitimate supply chain the drug was 
discovered, country manufactured, type of drug(s), unit cost, number of people affected 













 Table 9: Data Sources and Variable Information 
 
    










Product Type X X X X X
Volume X X
Average Price X X
Product Location X X X
Product Complexity X X
Product Shortage X
Previous Product 
Counterfeit X X X
Region X X X






The Red Book Online® is a database from the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) 
that provides information on drug manufacturers, drug active ingredients, whether a drug 
is a brand name or generic, packages size, as well as average package price and average 
unit price. 
 
The Intercontinental Marketing Services (IMS) Health provides current pharmaceutical 
data on sales of the top 20 global products and therapeutic classes along with top 
therapeutic classes by U.S. spending and channel distribution by U.S. spending. World 
Health Organization (WHO) provides data on percentage of counterfeit by therapeutic 
categories, testing methods used (if available) for screening counterfeit as well as the 
distribution channel drug in which the counterfeit was discovered. The aggregation of the 
various data sources, published literature, and case studies allowed the collection of 134 
data points that were used for analysis. 
 
4.4 Descriptive Summary  
The sample set for this research is comprised of 134 case analysis (N=134). As described 
in the data methodology section, these cases were collected from different sources and 
quantified for this research. 
 
Through extensive research and expert interviews, 10 variables are selected to be utilized 
in this research (see Table 10). The previous section provided detail description on each 







Table 11: Attributes Nomenclature 
Variable Variable Symbol 
Medication Class MC 
Volume VLM 
Average Price AVP 
Product Type  PT 
Drug Class  DC 
Region RG 
Product Complexity PC 
Product Shortage PS 
Previous Product Counterfeit PPC 
Product Location (Discovered) PL 
 
 
The variables are coded to enable further analysis to be conducted, for example, there are 
numerous types of medication class; therefore, a nomenclature had to be developed to 
enable us to conveniently state the type of medication class we are analyzing. 
Furthermore, several assumptions had to be made to ensure the proper coding of 
information.  
 
4.4.1 Medication Class 
According to Bihari (2008), a medication class is a group of medications that may work 
in the same way, have a similar chemical structure, or are used to treat the same health 
condition. In this research, we group identified products according to their medication 
classification (e.g., Cialis and Viagra are grouped as Life Style). In a sample size of 134 
(n), we discovered 20 different types of medication class. Table 11 shows the frequency 
distribution of counterfeit medicine by therapeutic class. From the analysis we discovered 





(~7%) are drugs with the highest counterfeit rates. It is important to note that within a 
medication type, various drug products exist with different price points and consumer 
demand. In this research, we take products and characterize them by medication class. 
         
Table 12: Descriptive Summary of Class of Counterfeit Medication 
Medication Class Frequency Percent 
ACE Inhibitor 5 3.73% 
Analgesic 9 6.72% 
Anticoagulant 1 0.75% 
Anti-diabetics 2 1.49% 
Anti-Infection 24 17.91% 
Anti-Obesity 4 2.99% 
Antipsychotic 3 2.24% 
Anti-Viral 4 2.99% 
Benzodiazepine 3 2.24% 
Beta Blocker 4 2.99% 
Birth-Control 1 0.75% 
Hormones 3 2.24% 
Life Style 26 19.40% 
NSAID 4 2.99% 
Oncology 8 5.97% 
Proton Pump Inhibitor 1 0.75% 
Statin 13 9.70% 
Steroids 7 5.22% 
Suppressants 4 2.99% 








4.4.2 Volume  
The total number of units sold in the last two years measures the volume (VLM) variable. 
The volume distribution captures the numbers of units sold for each product identified in 
this analysis. Approximately 59 % of products were in the 250 thousand range and above 
(see Figure 21). This variable is surrogate to measure drug demand since there are no 
other measures to capture product demand in the market place.  
 
 






4.4.3 Average Price 
The average price (AVP) variable is derived from the sum of all the unique product types 
unit cost divided by the different combination of unique products available in the market. 
This enables us to get an estimate of price per unit of drug. Figure 22 depicts the ranges 
of prices for drugs that were counterfeited in the data set created.  
 
 
Figure 22: Average Price per Unit of Counterfeit Drug 
 
4.4.4 Product Type 
The product type (TP) variable is composed of two elements: brand and generic drug 
products. A brand-name drug product is marketed under a specific trade name by a 
pharmaceutical manufacturer; however, the pharmaceutical manufacturer is the sole 
source for the drug product. A generic drug product is made with the same active 





generic name and can be produced by multiple pharmaceutical manufacturers. In the data 




Figure 23: Product Types 
 
4.4.5 Drug Class  
The drug class (DC) variable is composed of two elements: prescription (Rx) and over-
the-counter (OTC) drugs. OTC drugs may be sold directly to a consumer without a 
prescription from a healthcare professional, as compared to Rx drugs. Prescription 







Figure 24: Drug Class Type 
 
4.5.6 Region 
The region (RG) variable is comprised of geographical locations: Africa, Asia, Central 
America, Europe, Middle East, North and South America. These geographic locations 
cover the landscape of drug manufacturers as well as areas from which counterfeit drug 
products can originate. Table 12, depicts the frequency or count of counterfeit drugs for 
each geographic location. It is important to understand that this represents the location of 
origin and not necessarily, where the product was manufactured and/or counterfeited. It is 
interesting to see that in the majority of cases there is an association/link with Asia as the 
majority of offshore pharmaceutical manufacturing is occurring in either China or India. 
As the pharmaceutical manufacturing arena becomes more global, it is expected that a lot 
of products introduced into the US pharmaceutical supply chain will originate from 
different locations around the globe. Geographic location is an extremely important 
element in the decision making framework. From the meta-analysis conducted, most of 














North America 7 
Central America 5 
South America 5 
Middle East 1 
 
 
4.4.7 Product Complexity 
Product complexity (PC) is a derived variable from easy to manufacture, and cheap to 
copy concept. This variable characterizes the product technology and innovations 
required to manufacture and introduce the drug products into the pharmaceutical supply 
chain. Approximately 55% of the products were determined to be complex requiring 
technology, logistics planning, and shipping, which are not simple to execute (see Figure 
25). The complexity was assessed using an expert in the field of drug manufacturing. 
 
 





4.4.8 Product Shortage 
Product shortage (PS) attribute is introduced into the decision making model due to 
counterfeit events that have occurred in the past several years. Product shortages occurs 
when demand exceed supply due to disease out-breaks, natural disasters, and when 
manufacturers choose to stop producing or are experiencing production problems. Only 4 












4.4.9 Previous Product Counterfeiting 
The dataset revealed approximately 43% of products counterfeited had been counterfeited 
in the past and approximately 57% had no previous counterfeiting history (Figure 27). 
 
 
Figure 27 : Previous Counterfeit History 
 
 
4.4.10 Product Location 
Table 13 presents where and in some instances by which the products were discovered in 
the supply chain. Locations such as internet, illicit manufacturers, and pharmacies were 
the most prevalent supply chain location where counterfeit products were discovered. 
Customs, distributors, and law enforcements were methods through which counterfeit 













Table 14: Discovery Method and Product Location 
Discovery Method Frequency Percent 
Broker 2 1.49% 
Custom 26 19.40% 
Distributor 9 6.72% 
Doctors 2 1.49% 
Hospital 4 2.99% 
Internet 20 14.93% 
Mail Facility 1 0.75% 
Manufacturer (Illicit) 19 14.18% 
Online Pharmacy 6 4.48% 
Other 2 1.49% 
Patient 1 0.75% 
Pharmacy 20 14.93% 
Law Enforcement 2 1.49% 
Private Business 5 3.73% 
Retail 1 0.75% 
Supplier 2 1.49% 
Warehouse 3 2.24% 







Chapter 5: Data Analysis and Discussion  
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an overview of factor analysis and the results of its application to 
ten counterfeit attributes that were subsequently reduced to three explanatory factors. 
Also presented are the results of analyses conducted on drug counterfeit attributes data to 
determine (1) the empirical relationship of counterfeit attributes to explanatory factors (2) 
the empirical significance of each factor, and (3) a qualitative validation of the factors 
against the expert survey results. 
 
5.2 Factor Analysis 
This research utilized factor analysis (FA) to analyze counterfeit variables and their 
importance for ranking drugs at risk of being counterfeited. This FA approach was 
selected to reduce the initial number of counterfeit attributes to a small number of critical 
factors. This small number of critical factors typically explains most variability in the 
original measures (Sheskin, 2007). The fundamental assumption of FA is that there are 
underlying influences in the data, and these influences manifest in patterns of variance 
that move together (Groth, 2009). Table 14 lists statistical terms with definitions that are 
commonly used in factor analysis. 






Table 15: Factor Analysis Statistical Terms 
Term  Definition 
Variance 
Variance indicates the degree of 
dispersion (or spread) of the data. In 
simple terms, variance is the averaged 
squared-difference between values of 
the individual data points and the 
mean of the data.  
Factor A linear combination of variables, any combination, constitutes a factor. 
Factor Loadings 
Factor Loadings are the correlations 
of the variables with the factor 
(unobserved factor). 
Correlations 
In factor analysis, correlation 
coefficients are used to express 
relationships between variables. For 
example, the closer to zero a 
coefficient is, the less the relationship 
between the variables; the closer to 
one, the greater the relationship. 
Negative represents an inverse 
relationship. A correlation coefficient 
is interpreted by squaring it and 
multiply by 100. This gives the 
percent shared variation between two 
variables.  
 
Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) can be used to analyze the structure of a set of 
variables or when the latent structure of data is unknown or uncertain (Kim & Mueller, 
1978). In EFA, the variance in the observed data is created by several measured variables 
as well as by invisible factors that influence the variables. Each variable is the linear 
combination of its underlying influence [I] and a number of common influences [C], plus 
error (see Figure 28). The sum of these underlying variables results in an observable 






Figure 28 : EFA – Product of Underlying individual influence [I] and communality (common) 
influences [C]. (Groth, 2009) 
 
EFA was used for the following reasons: 
1. The multivariate data collected in this study were comprised of 10 counterfeit 
attributes but we have limited understanding of their relationships to one 
another  
2. EFA is powerful in extracting a small number of hidden factors in multivariate 





3. EFA can handle multicollinearity (e.g., variables that are highly correlated 
with each other) to produce stable and meaningful estimates for regression 
coefficients (Fekedulegn et al., 2002).  
 
5.2.1 Factor Analysis Basics 
A factor is an unobserved variable or a condensed statement of the relationships among a 
set of variables (Kline, 1994). In the example of Figure 29, the researcher assumes a 
structure prior to applying EFA. After EFA is applied, the researcher discovers that only 
two variables are relevant: Arithmetic and Geometry. After additional analysis, the 
research determines the unobserved factor that these variables describe is math ability. 
The unobserved factor was determined through the correlation between factors and 
variables.  
 
This correlation is referred to as a factor loading. Factor loadings are used to quantify the 
importance of a factor in explaining the variances of the variables. It is especially 








Figure 29 : Example of Factor and Variable Relationship 
(Source: https://assessingpsyche.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/independentfactors1.png) 
 
5.2.2 Process and Mathematics of Factor Analysis 
Figure 30 shows the factor analysis process. There are three important statistics in factor 
analysis: the means of variables, the variances of the variables, and the correlations 
among variables. The mean indicates the central tendency of a variable and variance 
indicates the degree of dispersion.  
 
















5.2.2.1 Data Screening  
Data screening is the first step in factor analysis. According to Kim & Mueller (1978), it 
is important to examine the correlation between the variables by creating a correlation 
matrix of all variables. The correlation matrix in factor analysis represents the correlation 
coefficients that are used to express relationships between variables. For example, the 
closer to zero a coefficient is, the less the relationship between the variables; the closer to 
one, the greater the relationship. Negative represents an inverse relationship. A 
correlation coefficient is interpreted by squaring it and multiplying it by 100. This gives 
the percent shared variation between two variables.  
 
This first step is important because it allows us to remove variable(s) that are measuring 
that are highly correlated. The second step in data screening is to ensure that all the 
variables in the study are standardized. Specifically, if the original variables are in 
different units, ensure all variables are standardized into one unit. For example, if a 
variable is expressed in ounces, its variance will be 16 x 16 = 256 times of that expressed 
in pounds. Then this variable will have more influence on the factor, and the original 
variables have different meanings and different numerical magnitude. For example, one 
variable measure in inches and another measuring pressure. Standardizing the variables 







5.2.2.2 Factor Extraction  
Two widely used factor extraction methods are maximum likelihood and principal axis 
factoring. These extraction methods (or analyses) determine how well the factors explain 
the variance in the data. Maximum likelihood estimation is used when the data are 
normally distributed and principal axis factoring estimation makes no assumption about 
the type of error or distribution types. 
 
The most important analysis or step in factor analysis is factor extraction. This portion of 
the analysis have some analyst subjectivity. Fortunately, there are several guidelines to 
alleviate the challenge in extracting and interpreting factors. The most commonly used 
techniques are the Kaiser-Guttman rule and the scree test. 
 
The Kaiser-Gutman rule is based on three principles: (1) obtain the eigenvalues derived 
from the correlation matrix; (2) determine how many eigenvalues are greater than 1.0; 
and (3) use the number to determine that latent dimensions. The fundamental idea behind 
the Kaiser-Guttman rules is that when the eigenvalue is less than 1.0, the variables 
explained by the factor is less than the variance of a single indicator. The eigenvalue 
measures the variance in all the variables, which is accounted for by that factor. 
Therefore, if a factor has a small eigenvalue, then it is contributing little to the 






The Scree test uses the eigenvalue to reduce the number of factors in the solution. It is a 
visual depiction of the eigenvalues to determine their importance (see Figure 31).The 
principle behind the scree test is that the important factors will have the higher 
eigenvalues which indicate that they also have larger variance. 
 
Figure 31 : Scree Test Plot 
 
 
5.2.2.3 Factor Rotation 
In factor analysis, the various extraction methods seek to extract a set of factors from the 
data. Initially, these factors are orthogonal to one another and ordered according to the 
proportion of the variance that the factor explains. However, this first extraction does not 
explain or make the results understandable, therefore, rotation makes the results more 
understandable by seeking the most meaningful and simple structure (see Figure 32) 






Figure 32 : Concept of Factor Rotation 
 
In general, there are two types of factor rotation used: orthogonal and oblique. 
Orthogonal rotation or solutions seek to find factors that are uncorrelated (Hatcher, 
1994). According to Kieffer (1998), orthogonal rotation “shifts the factors in the factor 
space maintaining 90 degrees angles of the factors to one another to achieve the best 
simple structure.” This facilitates the uncorrelated nature of the factors after the factors 
are rotated and provides easier interpretation of the analysis. Two types of orthogonal 
rotation methods used in factor analysis are varimax and quartimax rotation.  
 
Varimax rotation is the most used orthogonal rotation methods developed by Kaiser. 
Varimax method enables clearer depiction of large factor pattern/structure coefficient on 
only one of the factors. This method produces factors that have larger structure 
coefficients for a small number of variables and near-zero coefficients with the other 





correlate highly with one main factor and very little with the remaining factors (Kim & 
Mueller ,1978). This enables easier interpretation of the variable because one the 
variables load toward a single factor.  
 
 Orthogonal rotation provides us with several advantages (Kieffer, 1998): 
1. Factors remain perfectly uncorrelated with one another and are inherently easier 
to interpret; and 
2. Factor pattern matrix and structure matrix are equivalent; ensures solutions that 
are more meaningful. 
Oblique rotation provides correlations among the latent construct (Kim, 1978). The 
method is oblique because the angels between the factors become greater or less than the 
90-degree angle. Promax and direct oblimin are two popular oblique rotation methods. 
The promax technique attempts to achieve the most parsimonious structure by allowing 
the factors to correlation with one another. There are three steps in the promax rotation 
(Kieffer, 1998): 
1. Rotate factors orthogonally; 
2. Raise the factor pattern coefficients to an exponent greater than two; and 
3. Rotation of the original matrix to a best-fit position with the target matrix. 
The direct oblimin rotation method is driven by the “delta-value” concept that is typically 
chosen by the researcher. In this approach, positive values would generate larger 
correlations coefficients between factors and negative values would generate smaller 





that it allows researchers to map out the research objectives and relationship amongst the 
variables, as the correlations must be decided prior to the analysis (Kieffer, 1998).  
 
5.2.2.4 Factor Interpretation 
The last part of the factor analysis is to explain the factor results. In factor analysis, the 
factor that explained the least variance is removed from the analysis. In the wealth 
example provided in Table 15, only two factors are retained – Factor 1 and Factor 2. The 
numbers (factor loadings) depicted in the table express the relationship between the factor 
and the variable. The variable with the strongest relationship to factor is retained to that 
specific factor as it explains the factor the most. For example, Factor 1 is income, as it 
has the highest factor loading of 0.65. Since factor loadings can be interpreted as 
standardized regression coefficients, the relationship between the factor and the variable 
can be viewed as correlation as well (Rahn, 2015).  
 
 
Table 16 : Factor Interpretation (Rahn, 2015) 
Variables Factor 1 Factor 2 
Income 0.65 0.11 
Education 0.59 0.25 
Occupation 0.48 0.19 
House value 0.38 0.6 
Number of public parks in neighborhood 0.13 0.57 







The second part of the factor analysis is assessing the statistical significance of factor 
loadings. To assess the statistical significance of the factors it is important to understand 
the practical and statistical significance (Hair et al., 1998). 
 
Practical Significance: According to Hair et al. (1998) the approximations provided in 
Table 16 is more a rule of thumb used frequently to make a preliminary examination of 
the factors. In short, factor loadings (i.e., correlations of the factors with the variables) 
greater than ±0.30 are considered to be minimally important; loadings of ±0.40 are 
considered important, and loadings of ±0.50 are considered practically significant, Thus 
the larger the absolute size of the factor loading, the more important the loading in 
interpreting the factor. Because the factor loading is the correlation of the variable and 
the factor, the squared loading is the amount of the variable’s total variance account for 
the factor.  
 
Table 17 : Factor Significance Based on Sample Size (Hair et al., 1998) 
Factor Loading Sample Size 
0.40 200 












5.3 Drug Counterfeit Factor Analysis 
The data collected for this research is discussed in Chapter 4; it consists of 10 counterfeit 
attributes for analysis. First, a principle axis factoring method is applied to extract the 
initial factors and the varimax method is applied to rotate the factors to gain an 
interpretation of the factors. SAS® statistical software package was used to conduct the 
factor analysis. The result is presented in Table 17. 
 
Table 18: Initial Factors Extraction  
Attributes Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Medication Class (mc) 0.9010 0.1258 0.1051 
Volume (vlm) 0.6033 -0.1518 -0.4554 
Average Price (avp) 0.9452 0.0012 0.1637 
Product Location (pl) 0.0327 0.7900 -0.0313 
Product Type (pt) 0.8776 0.1355 0.1431 
Product Complexity (pc) -0.0516 0.8641 -0.2882 
Product Shortage (ps) -0.1488 0.0255 0.8480 
Previous Product Counterfeit (ppc) -0.2965 0.0526 0.4435 
Region (rg) 0.0022 0.6390 0.1294 
Drug Class (dc) 0.6811 0.4762 -0.5967 
 
 
The number of factors to retain was based on the eigenvalue scree test (see Figure 33). 
The scree test uses the eigenvalue to reduce the number of factors in the solution. It is a 
visual depiction of the eigenvalues to determine their importance. Eigenvalues greater 








Figure 33: Scree Test for Eigenvalues 
  
 
 In interpreting the factors in this study, a variable was said to load on a given factor if the 
factor loading was greater than .45 based on the sample size of 134. Using these criteria, 
five variables were found to load on the first factor (i.e., the first factor had correlations 
of absolute value greater than 0.45 with five of the variables); three variables were found 







Table 19 : Assessing Factor Significance 
Attributes Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
 Medication Class (mc) 0.9010 0.1258 0.1051 
Volume (vlm) 0.6033 -0.1518 -0.4554 
Average Price (avp) 0.9452 0.0012 0.1637 
Product Location (pl) 0.0327 0.7900 -0.0313 
Product Type (pt) 0.8776 0.1355 0.1431 
Product Complexity (pc) -0.0516 0.8641 -0.2882 
Product Shortage (ps) -0.1488 0.0255 0.8480 
Previous Product Counterfeit (ppc) -0.2965 0.0526 0.4435 
Region (rg) 0.0022 0.6390 0.1294 
Drug Class (dc) 0.6811 0.4762 -0.5967 
 
 





Factor 1 Average Price 0.945 
 
Drug Class 0.681 
 
Medication Class 0.901 
 
Product Type 0.878 
 Volume 0.603 
Factor 2 Product Complexity 0.864 
 
Product Location 0.790 
 Region 0.639 
Factor 3 Previous Product Counterfeiting 0.443 









Figure 34 : Conceptual Model for Drug Counterfeiting 
 
5.3.1 Factors Label 
The exploratory factor analysis of ten counterfeit attributes for Tables 19 and 20 yielded 
three dimensions of factors. These dimensions were described as Market Characteristics 
(MC), Supply Chain Characteristics (SCC), and Product Profile Characteristics (PPC) 
(see Figure 34). “Market Characteristics” consist of average price, drug class, medication 
class, product type, and volume. “Supply Chain Characteristics” consist of product 
complexity, product location, and region. “Product Profile Characteristics” consist of 









5.3.2 Enhanced Factors Significant Testing via Regression Analysis 
Following the identification of the new counterfeit factors, regression analysis was used 
to test their statistical significance. Statistical significance is when the p-value is less than 
significance level. That is, “the p-value is the probability of observing an effect given that 
the null hypothesis is true whereas the significance or alpha (α) level is the probability of 
rejecting the null hypothesis given that it is true” (Schlotzhauer, 2007). Each factor’s 
significance was tested against the outcome or response variable, which was chosen as 
the percentage of drug product counterfeited (CFT) in the past. 
 
The percentage of counterfeited drug used to determine factor significance, was obtained 
from publically available data (e.g., WHO, published journals, and PSI). It was not 
feasible to account for all counterfeit medicines by product type. To account for missing 
medication class data, a default 10% was used based on WHO estimates that 
approximately 10% of drugs worldwide are counterfeited (WHO, 2006). 
 
Standard multiple regression was used to test the relationship between factors 
(independent variable) and CFT (dependent variable). Multiple regression analysis was 
used to derive a linear equation that would best fit the relationship between the 






To determine factor significance identified in this study, a sum score method was used. In 
factory analysis, sum scores are used to develop factor scores so that regression analysis 
can be applied (DiStefano et al., 2009). Sum score by factor involves summing raw 
scores corresponding to all variables loading on a factor (DiStefano et al., 2009). For 
example, if a factor has a negative loading, the raw score of variable is subtracted rather 
than added in the analysis because the variable is negatively related to the factor. The 
sum score method is most desirable when the scales used to collect the original data are 
“untested and exploratory” (Hair et al, 2006). In addition, the sum score method 
preserves the variation in the original data. 
A regression analysis was performed on CFT against the independent variables MC, 
SCC, and PPC (Table 21). The estimates are statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level 
for MC and SCC but not for PPC. 
 
Table 21: Regression Results 
Predictor Coef SE Coef T P   
Constant -35.165 7.432 -4.73 0 
 MC 14.576 2.002 7.28 0 
 SCC 25.4 11.78 2.16 0.033 
 PPC 29.53 26.41 1.12 0.266 








Coefficients (Coef): Parameters of the Model 
Standard Error of Coefficients (SE Coef): Standard Error of the estimators  
T - Test: The t-test is used to test the significance of the model parameters and the 
response variable. The null hypothesis 𝐻0: 𝛽1 = 0: no significant relationship between the 
significant variable and independent variable(s) against 𝐻𝛼: 𝛽1 ≠ 0: significant 
relationship exists. 
The results presented in Table 21 indicated the MC and SCC are statistical significant on 
α = 0.05 when there regressed on counterfeit percentage data. Furthermore, PPC was not 
a significant factor, however, it was factor retained for model development based on 
experts and case studies evaluation. 
 
5.4 Qualitative Validation  
The model presented in Chapter 3 is important for three primary reasons: (1) to provide 
new variables for this study; (2) to validate existing and new variables previously 
identified through analysis of literature and an expert elicitation process; and (3) to 
provide qualitative validation that this model could be used in a decision-making context. 
The expert selection process, as well as the qualitative validation of counterfeited 
attributes, and a discussion of their influence on prioritizing products at risk of 







Experts provide their opinion about the degree of influence each variable has on 
counterfeiting. These experts indicate their opinion about the degree of influence as: 
 
Very Strong Indicator (+++) 
Strong Indictor (++)  
Good Indicator (+)  
 
Although the attributes were quantitatively validated and the factors validated through 
multivariate techniques, it is worth combining both analysis to see the differences (see 
Tables 22 & 23). If more than three experts responded with a very strong indication; the 
consensus is that the variable is a very strong indicator; if more than three responded with 
a combination of very strong and strong indicators, the consensus is a strong indicator; if 
more than three experts responded with a good indicator; the consensus is a good 
indicator. 
 



















Average Price +++ ++ +++ +++ +++ +++ 
Drug Class ++ ++ +++ +++ ++ +++ 
Medication Class ++ ++ ++ +++ +++ ++ 
Previous Product 
Counterfeiting 
+ + ++ + ++ + 
Product Complexity ++ ++ ++ ++ + ++ 
Product Location ++ + +++ ++ + +++ 
Product Shortage + + ++ NR + ++ 
Product Type ++ + ++ ++ + ++ 
Region +++ ++ +++ ++ ++ +++ 
Volume ++ + +++ ++ + ++ 
 
+++ = Very Strong Indicator 
++ = Strong Indicator 
+ = Good Indicator 








Table 23 : Qualitative Validation of Results 
Factors Variables Expert Consensus Factor Analysis Result 
MC a. Average Price  
b. Drug Class 
c. Medication Class 
d. Product Type 
e. Volume 
a. Very Strong  
b. Strong Indicator 
c. Strong Indicator 
d. Strong Indicator 
e. Strong Indicator 
a. 0.945 




SCC a. Product Complexity 
b. Product Location 
c. Region 
a. Strong Indicator 
b. Strong Indicator 




PPC a. Previous Product 
Counterfeiting 
b. Product Shortage 
a. Good Indicator 





5.5 Discussion and Implications  
5.5.1 Market Characteristics 
The results in Tables 20, 21, 22, and 23 represent salient findings that contribute to 
understanding the counterfeiting of pharmaceutical drugs. First, the results show that 
average price and medication class heavily influence the market characteristics factor. 
While other researchers published that price and medication class attributes are good 
indicators of a product’s risk of being counterfeited, they fail to identify the empirical 
relationship of these attributes to a common Factor. We further identified through 
multivariate analysis and expert opinion that these are “very strong” and “strong” 
indicators for ranking drugs at risk of counterfeiting. Regression analysis of the factor 
data indicated that is a statistically significant factor for determining drugs at risk of 
counterfeiting. Both factor analysis and experts indicate a consensus that the market 





type, and volume are loaded on MC in the order: Average Price, Medication Class, 
Product Type, Drug Class, and Volume.  
 
The results of this finding are in-line with other research (Spink, 2009; OECD, 2007; 
Staake et. al, 2010). Market characteristics can also be viewed as the counterfeiter’s 
willingness (ability) to produce a fake drug product. It is well known that counterfeiters 
often target products (e.g., drugs) that they can easily deceive authorities by their physical 
appearances.  
 
Bates (2008) further classified this finding, in that, counterfeiters target medication class 
based on the country the products are intended to be marketed. For example, 
counterfeiters target the counterfeiting of life style drugs in developed countries and anti-
malarial drug products in less developed countries. He stated that counterfeiters are 
beginning to target lifesaving drugs through traditional supply chains, which pose a great 
public health risk. Taking the drug medication class and volume into the drug 
prioritization framework, enables decision makers to focus on current and future threats 
in the drug supply chain. 
 
Average price and drug class can be viewed as another “Baiting-Element” for 
counterfeiters. Drug class in this study is defined as either prescription (Rx) or over-the-
counter (OTC) products. Typically, prescription products usually have a higher profit 





indicator for counterfeiters to get into the market. The baiting feature is the ability for the 
counterfeiter to make profit considering other costs such as production and cost to put 
fake products into the supply chain (Kontik, 2004; OECD, 2007b; Spink, 2009). The 
average price is a true indication as to why pharmaceutical counterfeiters enter the 
market. According to Staake et al. (2010), these features attract “Desperados.”. 
Counterfeiters usually target expensive products, easy to mimic, and whose quality is 
difficult to evaluate prior to purchase (Staake et al., 2010). It is important to mention that 
in this study, we discovered that the majority of the counterfeited brand-name products 
were prescriptions products. Pharmaceutical counterfeiting, however, is a still valid result 
and is in-line with other studies completed by Staake (2010) and Spink (2009).  
 
The volume attribute can be viewed as a “demand” factor. The result indicates that 
volume influences counterfeiters and the pharmaceutical products they target. In a 
decision making context, the amount of products available, by itself, it not a clear 
indicator that it will be counterfeited. Including volume will enable decision makers to 







5.5.2 Supply Chain Characteristics 
Supply chain characteristics factor (SCC) is measured by product complexity, product 
location, and region. From the analysis, we discovered that product complexity and 
product location heavily influence the supply chain characteristics. From the regression 
analysis, the SCC factor is significant in the model and is a useful for ranking drugs at 
risk of counterfeiting. We also discovered through factor analysis, that the variables are 
all significant based on the factor-loading test. Experts also validated that these variable 
are strong indicators for determining drug at risk of counterfeiting. 
 
According to Staake et al. (2010), product complexity is defined as the visual, functional, 
and intricacy of a drug. Experts identified “product complexity” as one of the most 
important characteristics of counterfeited articles. For example, brand names products are 
often counterfeited more than generic products because of their high profit margins. 
However, if the profit margin is the same between generic and brand name products, 
counterfeiters are indifferent as to which type of drug to produce. What makes a 
difference are logo-counterfeiting and the availability to production machinery (Stake et 
al., 2010). Logo-counterfeiting is expensive especially for some brand name products.. 
However, the increasing availability of production components makes it easier for 
counterfeiters to produce fake products.  
 
Product location variable is also a significant component of the supply chain 





purchased, final products are manufactured or sold, plays an important role in drug 
counterfeiting and potential harm to consumers. This is also a critical element to include 
in the drug prioritization model. Because, it allow decision makers to allocate resources 
in critical areas to sample and test drug products. In a study conducted by Opsec (2009), 
they found that internet pharmacies 50 % of cases when drug are purchased from internet 
sites conceal their actual physical address as well as provide false location of operation. 
They also found that many consumers are not aware that low price drug maybe an 
indicator that a drug contains substandard active ingredient or may come from an 
unregulated regions. With the pharmaceutical landscape rapidly changing; the 
manufacturing of drug products occurring at a global level and with the advent of 
technology (e.g., internet), counterfeiters are utilizing the full bandwidth to introduce 
counterfeit products into the legitimate supply chain.  
 
5.5.3 Product Profile Characteristics 
The third counterfeit factor, product profile characteristics (PPC) comprises product 
shortage and previous counterfeiting attributes. Both attributes are found in more recent 
incidences of counterfeited drug products, and are becoming more attractive to 
counterfeiters. Through regression analysis, this factor was not significant. However, 
through factor analysis the variable themselves were significant and were kept in this 
research. Experts also validated these variables as good indicators for determining drugs 
at risk of counterfeiting. Furthermore, it was evident from drug counterfeiting data used 
in this research, that product shortage and drugs with previous counterfeiting history are 






Cherici et al. (2011) provides some insights into the connection between drug shortages 
and the potential for counterfeiting. They discussed when products are scarce or in short 
supply, gray markets (parallel markets) inevitably becomes a source that introduces 
counterfeit products into the legitimate supply chain. Cherici et al. stated,  
In times of shortage, pharmacies may have no choice but to purchase from 
companies that are not among traditional contracted supplies. Most of the time, 
these suppliers are legitimate companies. But hiding in their midst are gray 
market impersonators. 
 
It is coincidental that product-shortage and previous counterfeiting variables load on the 
same factor. Previous counterfeiting is an important lagging attribute, in that; it educates 
decision makers about the products that were previous counterfeited and strategies that 
were taken to help to survey and test products. At the same time, this factor will ensure 
that similar medication class types counterfeited in the past are taken into consideration 







5.6 Implications for Private and Regulator Decision Makers 
As noted in the previous chapters, this research provides supply chain risk managers and 
other decision makers with a framework for understanding the factors that influence drug 
counterfeiting and provide empirical evidence about the factors differences on 
counterfeiting. The conceptual framework along with the empirical evidence is useful on 
two levels, an industry level and drug regulatory level. At the industry level, the 
framework helps supply chain managers to understand the interrelations among the 
variables and their overall contribution to the decision making for various initiatives. 
These initiatives include procuring products, supply chain validations, security polices, 
and advancing anti-counterfeiting technologies to protect branded and generic products. 
At the regulatory level (government), the framework can be used to prioritize drugs at 
risk of counterfeiting in a given inventory and to develop new policies to better target 
drugs in the supply chain at risk of counterfeiting.  
 
From a market characteristics perspective, this analysis suggests that both regulatory and 
private entities focus on medication class and average unit prices. Other researchers 
(Spink 2009, OECD, 2007) suggested using all attributes in a decision model without 
prioritizing their importance. This study suggest if resources (e.g., monetary) are limited, 
it is reasonable to focus on average unit price, medication class, and product type (e.g., 







Furthermore, this research also highlighted another very critical factor, the supply chain 
characteristics. This analysis suggests that regulatory and private entities should focus on 
country of origin and product location (or supply chain location) as good indicators to 










This chapter presents the development of the drug counterfeit model and its subsequent 
validation. The model expresses an empirical relationship between the counterfeiting risk 
attributes of a pharmaceutical drug product and the likelihood of product being 
counterfeited. The resulting relationship enables ranking drug products by the likelihood 
of counterfeiting. 
 
Using the set of risk attributes discussed in previous chapters, a dataset was built from 
known counterfeit cases. The dataset includes the following attributes:  
• Average Price 
• Drug Class 
• Medication Class 
• Product Type 
• Volume 
•  Product Complexity 
•  Product Location 
• Region 
• Previous Product Counterfeiting 





The ten risk attributes were grouped to three factors: Product Profile Characteristics 
(PPC), Market Characteristics (MC), and Supply Chain Characteristics (SCC). 
 








Figures 35 depict the process to determine the likelihood of drug counterfeit. The models 
presented in the previous sections were combined to generate drug composite counterfeit 
scores (CCS). These CCS were derived from the addition of the three factors: MCC, 
PPC, and SCC. The CCS by themselves does not indicate the likelihood of drug 





proposed approach for obtaining a drug composite score and determining the likelihood 
of drug counterfeit 
6.2 Drug Counterfeit Model 
We propose a linear model for predicting drug products at risk of counterfeiting: 
Composite CFT Score =  β0 +  β1 MC +  β2 SCC +  β3 PPC  Equation 6-1 
Where: 
Composite CFT Score: drug counterfeit propensity score 
MC: Market Characteristics 
SCC: Supply Chain Characteristics 
PPC: Product Profile Characteristics 
 
Market characteristics (MC) are average price, drug class, medication class, product type, 
and volume. Market characteristics are modeled as: 








Drug Price 𝒙𝒑 p =Average Unit Drug Price  
Drug Class 
  
𝒙𝒄 c = [OTC or Rx] 
0 = OTC 
1= Rx 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇  𝒙𝒕 t = [Generic or Brand] 
0= Generic 
1= Brand 
𝑀𝑇𝑃𝑀𝑃𝑀𝑃𝑀𝑃𝑀 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑇𝑇  𝒙𝒎𝒄 mc = 1…20 
[see Table 24] 






Supply chain characteristics (SCC) are modeled as: 
 






𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑃𝑀𝑃𝑀 𝒙𝒍  l = [location] 
0 = low risk location 
1= high risk location 
𝑅𝑇𝑅𝑀𝑃𝑀  𝒙𝒓 r = [geographic location] 
0 = Africa, 1= Asia, 2=Europe, 
3= Latin/South America, 4 = 
Middle East, 5 = North America 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝐶𝑃𝐶𝑇𝐶𝑇𝐶𝑀𝑃𝑇 
  
𝒙𝒑𝒄 pc = [complexity] 




Product profile characteristics are model as: 
 




Attribute Name Attribute 
Characteristics 
Attribute Index 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑆ℎ𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑅𝑇  𝒙𝒔 s = [shortage] 
0 = Drug not in shortage 
1= Drug in shortage 
𝐻𝑀𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇 𝑃𝑜 𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑃𝑇𝑃𝑜𝑇𝑀𝑃  𝒙𝒉 h = [counterfeit history] 
0 = no previous counterfeit 
1= previously counterfeited 
 
 
The model presented in Equation 6.1 is the first step toward quantifying the probability of 
products at risk of drug counterfeiting. Figure 35 depicts the process of the obtaining 






6.3 Estimating Attribute States 
An empirical probability (relative frequency) approach is used to estimate the attribute 
states from the data collected. The empirical probability (relative frequency) is obtained 
by dividing the frequency for that class by the total number of observations (Jaisingh, 
2000). 
The empirical probability is estimated through the following: 
 
𝑜𝑖 =  
𝑛𝑖
𝑁
=  𝑛𝑖∑ 𝑛𝑗𝑗    
Or 
𝑅𝑇𝐶𝑀𝑃𝑀𝑣𝑇 𝐹𝑃𝑇𝑞𝑃𝑇𝑀𝑃𝑇 =  𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
   Equation 6.5 
. 
 
6.3.1 Medication Class 
The empirical probability formalism is used to approximate the values for each 
medication class. 𝑷(𝑴𝑪𝒎| 𝑪) represents the conditional probability of a certain drug 
being in a medication given that it is counterfeited. From the counterfeited data gathered 
in this study, one can take each counterfeit case and determine its medication class. The 
estimated conditional probability of a drug being counterfeited (𝑇.𝑅. ,𝑃(𝑀𝐶𝑚| 𝐶)) is 
then a frequency in the data set collected. 
 
𝑃(𝑀𝐶𝑚| 𝐶) =
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑖𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠(𝑚)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠






Table 24:  Probabilities for Medication Class 
Medication Class Medication State Probability 
ACE Inhibitor 1 3.73E-02 
Analgesic 2 6.72E-02 
Anticoagulant 3 7.46E-03 
Antidiabetics 4 1.49E-02 
Anti-Infection 5 1.79E-01 
Anti-Obesity 6 2.99E-02 
Antipsychotic 7 2.24E-02 
Anti-Viral 8 2.99E-02 
Benzodiazepine 9 2.24E-02 
Beta Blocker 10 2.99E-02 
Birth-Control 11 7.46E-03 
Life Style 12 1.94E-01 
NSAID 13 2.99E-02 
Oncology 14 5.97E-02 
Proton Pump 
Inhibitor 15 7.46E-03 
Statin 16 9.70E-02 
Steroids 17 5.22E-02 
Hormones 18 2.99E-02 
Suppressants 19 5.97E-02 





The attribute “region” represents the country of origin for drugs being imported into the 
US. As explained in chapter 4, the origin of drugs is classified into six regions: Africa, 
Asia, Europe, Latin/South America, Middle East, and North America. This information is 





intelligence on how the likelihood of drug being counterfeited is influence based on its 
origin. This data is utilized to form the degree of influence of region on the likelihood of 
drug counterfeit. Using Equation 6.7, we have the following: 
 
𝑃(𝑅𝐺𝑧| 𝐶) =
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑖𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑏𝑦 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑧)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠
  Equation 6.7 
 
𝑷(𝑹𝑮𝒛| 𝑪) represents the conditional probability of getting a certain drug from a region 
given that it’s counterfeited. From the counterfeited data gathered in this study, one can 
take each counterfeit case by region, and estimate the conditional probability by its 
frequency. The estimates are presented in Table 25.  
 





Latin/South America 3.73E-02 
Middle East 7.46E-03 




6.3.3 Drug Shortage 
Drug shortage attribute represents drugs that are in shortage. Information on product 
shortages can be obtained through the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and 





derived the following formalism to determine the degree of influence shortage history on 
the likelihood of a drug being counterfeited: 
 
𝑃�𝑃𝑆𝑞| 𝐶�  =
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑖𝑡 𝑑𝑟𝑢𝑔𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒(𝑞)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑟𝑢𝑔𝑠
 Equation 6.8 
 
𝑷�𝑷𝑺𝒒| 𝑪� represents the conditional probability of a certain drug being in shortage 
given that it’s counterfeited. From the counterfeited data gathered in this study, one can 
get this probability by identifying the number of drugs in shortage, and the estimated 
conditional probability is then its frequency. This conditional probability is presented in 
Table 26.  
 
 
Table 26:  Probabilities for Drug Shortages 





6.3.4 Drug Class 
The attribute “Drug Class” makes a distinction between drugs that are prescription (Rx) 
and over-the-counter (OTC). Using Equation 6.9, we derived the following formalism to 
determine the degree of influence of drug class on the likelihood of a drug being 
counterfeited: 
 
𝑃(𝐷𝐶𝑙| 𝐶)  =
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑖𝑡 𝑑𝑟𝑢𝑔𝑠 𝑏𝑦 𝐷𝑟𝑢𝑔 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 (𝑙)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑟𝑢𝑔𝑠







𝑷(𝑫𝑪𝒍| 𝑪) represents the conditional probability of a drug being in certain drug class 
(i.e., OTC or Rx) given that it’s counterfeited. From the counterfeited data gathered in 
this study, one can get these probabilities by identifying the number of drugs in a drug 
class, and the estimated conditional probability is its frequency .These conditional 
probabilities are presented in Table 27.  
 
 
Table 27 : Probabilities for Drug Class 




6.3.5 Product Type 
The attribute “product type” distinguishes between brand and generic products. Using 
Equation 6.10, we derived the following formalism to determine the degree of influence 
of product type on the likelihood of a drug being counterfeited: 
 
𝑃(𝑃𝑇𝑖| 𝐶)  =
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑖𝑡 𝑑𝑟𝑢𝑔𝑠 𝑏𝑦 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒(𝑖)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑟𝑢𝑔𝑠
  Equation 6.10 
 
𝑷(𝑷𝑻𝒊| 𝑪) represents the conditional probability of a drug being in certain product type 
(i.e., brand or generic) given that it is counterfeited. From the counterfeited data gathered 





product type, and the estimated conditional probability is its frequency .These conditional 
probabilities are presented in Table 28.  
 
 
Table 28 : Probabilities for Product Type 





6.3.6 Previous Drug Counterfeit History 
To estimate the influence of previous drug counterfeit history on the likelihood of drug 
counterfeit, we calculated the relative frequency of medication classes that has repeated 
history counterfeit (i.e., more than one known cases of counterfeiting). The data collected 
in this study indicated that sixteen out of twenty-one medication classes had been 
counterfeited more than once and only five-medication class had one known history of 
counterfeiting. Therefore, to determine 𝐶ℎ, we assumed that when there is a known 
previous history of counterfeiting,  𝐶ℎ is the following (Table 29): 
 
 𝐶ℎ (𝑇𝑇𝑇) =  
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑛 𝑂𝑛𝑐𝑒 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠
 Equation 6.11 







Table 29 : Probabilities for Previous Drug Counterfeit History 






6.3.7 Average Price and Volume  
Both average price and volume attributes will be distribution based. Two distributions are 
depicted in Figures 36 & 37. The cumulative distribution functions (CDF) were derived 
in Minitab©.  The best-fitted distribution for both variables is lognormal. Based on the 
distribution statistics, two CDF’s were developed to best represent average price and 
volume attributes.  Unlike the other attributes, average price and volume are a lot more 
complex to get estimated weights because of the different price ranges and volumes that 
are available within the medication class alone. It will be difficult to quantify every 
product with price ranges and volume. Therefore, to enable quantification of the 
















































































































6.3.8 Product Complexity 
Product complexity attribute measure several important features of the product such as 
product technology labeling, product manufacturing, and logistics features etc. Gathering 
information on these features on all products for quantification would be extremely 
difficult because such information does not exist in a database for all products. However, 
regulatory bodies or private entities can rely on their subject matter experts (or expert 
elicitation) to assess product complexities based on features discussed in this research. In 
this research, product complexity for each of product was determined because of the 
small amount of cases (n=134) that was available. Using Equation 6.12, the weights are 
determined for product complexity and are presented in Table 30. 
 
𝑃(𝑃𝐶𝐶| 𝐶)  =
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑖𝑡 𝑑𝑟𝑢𝑔𝑠 𝑏𝑦 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑐)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑟𝑢𝑔𝑠
     Equation 6.12 
 
 
Table 30 : Probabilities for Product Complexity 
Product Complexity Weight 










6.3.9 Product Location  
Product location represents where counterfeit drugs can be detected in the supply chain or 
where consumers can buy fake products. This attribute has two states: high and low risks. 
High risk locations considers where consumers has full access in getting medication from 
the internet (includes buying Rx or OTC products) and from entities that that hide under 
the radar from regulator bodies. A low risk location considers where counterfeit has the 
potential in infiltrating the supply chain if not detected and tested. They include 
wholesale (e.g. secondary), distributors or suppliers, pharmacies and customs etc. Using 
Equation 6.13, the probabilities are determined for product location and are presented in 
Table 31. 
 
𝑃(𝑃𝐿𝑟| 𝐶)  =
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑖𝑡 𝑑𝑟𝑢𝑔𝑠 𝑏𝑦 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑟)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑟𝑢𝑔𝑠
     Equation 6.13 
 
 
Table 31 : Probabilities Product Location 
Product Location Weight 
High Risk 7.40E-01 













6.4 Results and Interpretation 
The relationship between CFT Composite Score (CCS) and CFT Probability is proposed 
to estimate the probability of drug counterfeit. The CFT Composite Score (CCS) is 
derivation from the models proposed in section 6.2. The detail to derive a CCS score to 
CFT probability is depicted in Figure 36. 
 
The derived relationship is depicted in Figure 37. The CFT probability measures were 
gathered from previous drug counterfeiting studies as discussed in chapters 4 and 5. For 
example, an estimated probability measure of 0.2 was determined for a certain drug 
product through analysis done by Health Authorities (20 products positive for 
counterfeiting out of 100 randomly sampled). Using the counterfeiting data collected by 
product, we can fit a relationship between CFT probability and CFT Composite Score to 










Figure 38: Process to Derive CFT Score to CFT Probability  
 
Figure 38 depicts the best-fitted model based on the R-Square (adjusted) which is 26.00 
%. The overall CFT (probability) model is shown in Equation 6-14.  
 
𝐶𝐹𝑇 (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑀𝑏𝑀𝐶𝑀𝑃𝑇) =  0.09280 +  0.008356 𝐶𝐶𝑆 +  0.008117 𝐶𝐶𝑆2  Equation 6-14 
      Where: 
CFT: Probability of Drug Counterfeit 







Figure 39: Composite CFT Scores to a Probability Measure  
 
Through examination of the results, we see that are three important regions: The Red, 
Green, and Blue zones each represent a degree or probability of drug counterfeiting.   
 
• The red zone is a representation of drug products that are high risk of drug 
counterfeiting - high demand products with high unit price as well as low 
complexity of manufacturing, branded products, and importing from regions that 
have known history of product counterfeiting. Drug products having CFT scores ≥ 
0 with probabilities ≥ 0.2 are red zone products.  
• Drug products having CFT scores ≥ 0 with probabilities ≤ 0.2 are green zone 
products. These are high demand products with high unit prices as well as 





known history of product counterfeiting. Products in this region are majority 
branded products and prescription products 
• Drug products in the blue zone are majority over-the-counter (OTC) products. 
Products in this region are purchased from internet sources. Thus, the model 
distinguishes among major categories of counterfeiting risk, which aids in 
planning counter measures. 
 
Based on the relationship established we were able to assess the likelihoods of 13 
counterfeit cases that occurred using the model produced from the fitted relationship 
produced in Figure 37. The results are depicted in Figure 38. 
 
  




























Chapter 7: Model Uncertainty and Validation  
 
7.1 Introduction 
Model uncertainty analysis is essential to allow the identification at some level of 
confidence, the range of possible and probably values of the unknowns of interest. Our 
expression or knowledge of the unknown of interest is incomplete which implies 
uncertainty. Uncertainties may arise from researchers own assumptions and perceptions 
of the unknown of interest (Kazemi, 2011).  
 
In this section, we will focus on model uncertainty using a Bayesian framework to 
improve the predictions of the CFT model. A Bayesian framework (Droguett & Mosleh, 
2008) to update the predictive model is utilized to account for model error and provide a 
more reliable estimate using the CFT model presented in section 6.3. 
 
Droguett and Mosleh (2008) presented their perspective on model uncertainty and 
discussed model uncertainty arises when we have the following: 
• No plausible model, 
• A single model, generally accepted, but not completely validated, 
• Conceptually accepted and validated models, but of uncertain quality of 
implementation, 
• A single model covering some but not all relevant aspects of the problem, 
• Presence of multiple plausible models, 





• Multiple models, each covering different aspects of the reality of interest, 
and 
• Composite models formed from sub-models with different degrees of 
accuracy and credibility. 
The uncertainty sources mentioned before (chapter 5) deal with values assumed by the 
model (parameter uncertainty) or the model itself (model uncertainty). Droguett and 
Mosleh (2008) developed two forms of models to deal with model uncertainty: Additive 
Error Model and Multiplicative Error Model discussed in section 7.2. 
 
7.2 Framework 
We are interested in assessing the true value of 𝐶𝐹𝑇 , the likelihood of drug counterfeit. 
The counterfeit model’s prediction is set as evidence, 𝐸 =  𝐶𝐹𝑇∗. The goal is to develop 
an uncertainty distribution of probability of counterfeit,𝐶𝐹𝑇 , given the evidence from the 
prediction of the counterfeit model developed in section 6.3. This uncertainty can be 
expressed as follows: 
 
𝜋�𝐶𝐹𝑇| 𝐶𝐹𝑇������∗ � =  
𝐿( 𝐶𝐹𝑇∗|𝐶𝐹𝑇)𝜋0(𝐶𝐹𝑇)
∫ 𝐿� 𝐶𝐹𝑇∗�𝐶𝐹𝑇�𝜋0(𝐶𝐹𝑇) 𝑑𝑐𝑓𝑡𝐶𝐹𝑇
   Equation 7.0 
 
where   𝜋 �𝐶𝐹𝑇| 𝐶𝐹𝑇∗ � is the posterior distribution of drug counterfeit likelihood 
𝐶𝐹𝑇,𝜋0(𝐶𝐹𝑇) is the prior distribution of 𝐶𝐹𝑇, and 𝐿( 𝐶𝐹𝑇∗|𝐶𝐹𝑇) is the Likelihood of 






7.3 Multiplicative Error Likelihood Model 
The multiplicative error model has several advantages over the additive model. Ontiveros 
and Modarres (2013) lists the common pitfalls of the additive model: 
• Percentage error can be negative, zero, or positive; this forces the normal 
distribution assumption for the percentages errors; 
• The choices of likelihood function is limits the random variable to normal 
distribution because of the percentage error (negative, zero, or positive); 
• The distribution error between the model prediction and experiment cannot be 
analytically derived; and 
• When data is widely scattered the normal distribution assumptions results in 
negative lower bounds with no meaningful physical interpretation. 
 
 
The advantages of the multiplicative model are: 
 
• Model predictions, result of the experiment, and real value of interest have the 
same sign (all positive or all negative); 
• Ratio of the real value and experiments results is a random variable with 
lognormal distribution for which the confidence bounds are known; 
• The distribution of the random variable is lognormal and will be used to represent 
the likelihood of the data; and 
• The distribution of the real quantity [value] of interest given a model prediction 







An estimate obtained from the model is considered a random variable X*, which is the 
product of the true but unknown value, x, and a random error , X* = x E, in which X* is 
the model estimate, x is the true value of the predicted variable, and E is a random 
multiplicative error The realizations of the model, x* (i=1,…,n) are then 𝒙𝑖∗= 𝒙𝑖𝑡 𝒆𝑖, where 
𝒙𝒊  and 𝒆𝒊 are realizations of the random variables X* and E, 𝒙𝒊𝒕 is the vector of true 
values of x at i. Therefore, each realization of 𝑇𝑖 of E is the quotient between the model’s 
estimates 𝐶𝑖∗ and the true value at i, 𝑇𝑖 =  𝐶𝑖∗/ 𝐶𝑖𝑡 . Taking the logarithms, ln𝑋∗ =
ln 𝐶 + ln𝐸. Assuming that ln E is normally distributed, the Likelihood function become: 
 








 Equation 7.1 
 
in which 𝜽 = {𝑏,𝜎}. This is log-normal with median (i.e., bias factor) 𝑏 =  𝐸50, and 
standard deviation 𝜎.1 
 
The posterior distribution for the set of parameters 𝜽 is: 
 
𝜋(𝑏,𝜎 |𝑇1, … 𝑇𝑛) =  
𝐿 (𝑒1,…𝑒𝑛| 𝑏,𝜎) 𝜋0(𝑏,𝜎)
∬𝐿 (𝑒1,…𝑒𝑛| 𝑏,𝜎) 𝜋0(𝑏,𝜎)𝑑𝑏𝑑𝜎
    Equation 7.2 
Assuming the each pair of experimental and corresponding model estimates are 
independent realizations: 
𝐿 (𝑇1, … 𝑇𝑛| 𝑏,𝜎) =  ∏ 𝐿 (𝑇𝑖| 𝑏,𝜎)𝑛𝑖=1  Equation 7.3 
 
                                                 





The form of the multiplicative error model is the following: 










𝑖=1  Equation 7.4 
 
Substituting (7-5) into (7-2), we have the following representation: 
























𝑖=1 𝜋0(𝑏,𝜎)𝑃𝑏𝑃𝜎 is a normalizing constant and 𝜋0(𝑏,𝜎) is 
the prior distribution on b and 𝜎 . 
 
7.4 Drug Counterfeit Model Uncertainty 
Adapting the above formulation, the Likelihood for the drug counterfeit model becomes, 









 Equation 7.7 
 
in whch, 𝑏𝑐𝑓𝑡 =  𝐸50 is the median of the error distribution, and 𝜎𝑐𝑓𝑡 is the standard 
deviation. The posterior PDF of the parameters 𝑏𝑐𝑓𝑡,𝜎𝑐𝑓𝑡 is: 
𝜋�𝑏𝑐𝑓𝑡,𝜎𝑐𝑓𝑡 �𝜀1, … 𝜀𝑛) =  
𝐿 (𝜀1,…𝜀𝑛|𝑏𝑐𝑓𝑡,𝜎𝑐𝑓𝑡) 𝜋0(𝑏𝑐𝑓𝑡,𝜎𝑐𝑓𝑡)
∬  𝐿 (𝜀1,…𝜀𝑛|𝑏𝑐𝑓𝑡,𝜎𝑐𝑓𝑡) 𝜋0(𝑏𝑐𝑓𝑡,𝜎𝑐𝑓𝑡)𝑑𝑏𝑐𝑓𝑡𝑑𝜎𝑐𝑓𝑡
  Equation 7.8 
 
where 𝜋0(𝑏𝑐𝑓𝑡,𝜎𝑐𝑓𝑡) is the prior distribution of  𝑏𝑐𝑓𝑡,𝜎𝑐𝑓𝑡 and {𝜀1, … , 𝜀𝑛} is a vector of 
calibration data. 

















𝑖=1 𝜋𝑜�𝑏𝑐𝑓𝑡,𝜎𝑐𝑓𝑡� Equation 7.9 
 
where 𝜋0(𝑏𝑐𝑓𝑡,𝜎𝑐𝑓𝑡) is the prior distribution of  𝑏𝑐𝑓𝑡,𝜎𝑐𝑓𝑡 , and k; 
k =∬∏ 1𝜎𝑐𝑓𝑡 𝑇
−12 �𝑒𝑖−𝑏𝑐𝑓𝑡𝜎𝑐𝑓𝑡 �
2
𝜋0�𝑏𝑐𝑓𝑡,𝜎𝑐𝑓𝑡�𝑛𝑖=1  𝑃𝑏𝑐𝑓𝑡𝑃𝜎𝑐𝑓𝑡 Equation 7.10 
 

































The new posterior of the counterfeit prediction model becomes the following: 
𝜋(𝐶𝐹𝑇|𝐶𝐹𝑇∗, 𝜀1, … , 𝜀𝑛) =
1
𝑘
 𝐿(𝐶𝐹𝑇∗, 𝜀1, … , 𝜀𝑛|𝐶𝐹𝑇)𝜋0(𝐶𝐹𝑇) Equation 7.12 






7.5 Bayesian CFT Model Uncertainty Analysis and Validation 
To validate the model; we updated the 13 counterfeit cases that were presented in this 
section and included 10 new cases studies that were not counterfeited. The procedure to 
validate the counterfeit drug model is depicted in Figure 39.  
 
 





7.5.1 Bayesian Updates 
Using 120 counterfeit cases, we can now apply the framework to improve our model 
predictions. The 120 counterfeit cases are the performance data used to calibrate the 
model. Then we used 13 additional counterfeit cases, which had been removed from the 
data set, to demonstrate that with updating the model with new case(s), the model 
prediction (performance) improves. In other words, as we update the model with 
additional cases (N = 120, N+1, N+2, N + …), the performance of the model prediction 
for each counterfeit case improves. 
  
The Bayesian computations were done using the “The Model Uncertainty Software” 
created by the Center for Risk and Reliability Engineering at the University of Maryland, 
College Park, in 2006 and is available at that center, following the procedure of Section 
7.4.  
 
Figure 40 depicts (for one case) the distribution of the posterior function of the prediction 
for drug counterfeiting taking into account the performance of the CFT prediction model. 
The graph in Figure 40 depicts one counterfeit case prior and after Bayesian updating 
using performance data. Prior to using the performance data to update, we see that the 
CFT model predicted the probability of drug counterfeit as 0.163. After updating the 
model with the performance data, we see that the model new prediction (posterior mean) 
is 0.144 with the actual product counterfeit being 0.10. We see that the prediction 
improved using the Bayesian method. Using the Bayesian method, the results of our new 





original CFT predictions error was approximately 33%, with the Bayesian updating it 
was 19%.  
 
 








Table 32 : Counterfeit Cases Predictions with Bayesian Updating 





Case 1 0.160 0.158 0.070 
Case 2 0.130 0.079 0.100 
Case 3 0.130 0.095 0.070 
Case 4 0.130 0.070 0.090 
Case 5 0.130 0.081 0.100 
Case 6 0.140 0.101 0.120 
Case 7 0.150 0.140 0.100 
Case 8 0.160 0.144 0.070 
Case 9 0.180 0.209 0.200 
Case 10 0.220 0.310 0.370 
Case 11 0.260 0.250 0.230 
Case 12 0.280 0.382 0.330 










The results shown in Figure 41 represent the 13 counterfeit case after calibrated with the 
Bayesian method. Using the performance data (n = 120), each case was ran 
independently and the probabilities presented in graph above represent the posterior mean 
of each counterfeit case.  
 
 
Figure 41: Models Errors: CFT Model and CFT Bayesian  
Figure 41 compares the error for each individual counterfeit case after calibration. We see 






7.5.2 Model with Cases Not Counterfeited 
To validate the model with drugs that are less likely to be counterfeited will ensure that 
model predictions are reliable enough to accept the outcomes. To do so, one compliance 
regulatory expert was asked to provide 10 cases of drugs that are less likely to be 
counterfeited as well as asked to rank the product complexity (complex or not complex) 
using the criteria’s provided in this research. The results of the 10 cases are depicted in 
Figures 42, 43 and Table 33. The results obtained from the model predictions depict 
small likelihoods of drug counterfeiting.  
 
                       Table 33 : Test Cases Outcome with Bayesian Updating Method 




Case 1 0.035 0.026 
Case 2 0.030 0.015 
Case 3 0.074 0.031 
Case 4 0.078 0.034 
Case 5 0.085 0.041 
Case 6 0.075 0.033 
Case 7 0.082 0.038 
Case 8 0.086 0.056 
Case 9 0.070 0.030 



















The results provided by the model predictions are low probabilities of counterfeiting 
compared to cases that were counterfeited. Figure 42 depicts the model predictions are 
not erroneous. Each case selected by the regulatory expert had small probabilities of 
counterfeiting because of drug tight controls around the drug manufacturing process, low 






Chapter 8: Research Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the research findings, conclusions and implications of these 
finding for preventing drug counterfeiting in the pharmaceutical industry.  
 
By using factor and regression analyses, three distinct counterfeit factors emerged: 
Market Characteristic, Product History Characteristics, and Supply Chain Characteristics. 
Taking into account these three factors, decision makers can assess products in an 
objective and robust way to determine which products are greater risk of counterfeiting 
and develop policies and strategies to mitigate or minimize counterfeit drugs in the 
legitimate supply chain.  
 
8.2 Public Health  
Globalization has served as a catalyst for counterfeiters to exploit and profit from weak 
regulations and complexities in the pharmaceutical supply chain (i.e., buying fake 
products online). Under this scenario, there are more reports of counterfeit products 
finding their way into the homes of consumers. Deaths and illnesses related to 
counterfeits drugs continue to grow.  
 
The findings and the model created in this dissertation could benefit private entities and 





• With the growing number of counterfeit products entering the supply chain; 
regulators for example cannot spread limited resources to every point in the 
pharmaceutical supply chain. This research provides a method to rank drug 
products based on their likelihoods of counterfeiting. This enables private entities 
and regulators to focus on products in a smarter way for sampling and testing. 
• Using the drug counterfeit model with statistical sampling tool could help private 
and regulatory bodies to develop robust sampling plans to test the supply chain. A 
statistical sampling plan is a cost effective method for determining how many 
products to sample after it is determined which products should be under 
surveillance. In addition, a sampling plan is useful when there are potentially 
serious product risks (e.g., counterfeiting) (Montgomery, 2001). Sampling plans 
such as ABC-STD-105 which is based on MIL-STD-105D developed by the 
United States Military in 1963 can be utilized to develop different strategies for 
sampling and testing.  





8.3 Supply Chain  
The rise in terrorist activities has also affected the drug supply chain (Deloitte, 2014). In 
particular, the Internet has been and will be a catalyst for criminals to introduce 
counterfeit products into the legitimate supply chain. The majority of online pharmacies 
have locations around the globe and they are unregulated or lack proper credentials to 
engage in the distribution of drugs (Liang & Mackey, 2012). This research highlighted 
that counterfeit drugs can be purchased through the internet by consumers not knowing 
the real risk. This model utilized supply chain characteristics factor to help decision 
makers identify potential avenues counterfeit drugs can infiltrate the market without 
detection. The traditional pharmaceutical supply chain is becoming more complex with 
the digital age; therefore, it is imperative that much more focus be placed on the “cyber-
pharmaceutical-supply-chain.”  
 
8.4 Future Landscape - Drug Shortages Increasing Trend 
Drug shortages, an attribute not considered in previous studies was introduced in this 
research and is considered an important element. Although, the overall product profile 
characteristic was not statistically significant, this factor must be considered because 
when drug shortages occurs, physicians, hospitals, and patients explore options such as 
purchasing drugs online (Liang & Mackey, 2011). This creates an opportunity for 
counterfeiters to introduce poor quality or counterfeit drugs into the legitimate supply 
chain. This research recommends the inclusion of drug shortages and past counterfeiting 
attributes data into the decision-making process to develop policies for mitigating and 





the likelihood of counterfeiting, there should be a determination about which product(s) 
can be sold over the internet, and strategies developed to target and sample products as 
well as to develop appropriate risk communication tools.  
 
In addition, this study indicates that whenever a pandemic occurs, this model should be 
used to determine which products or substitute products are at risk for being 
counterfeited, and develop dynamic surveillance systems to educate the public of the 
potential health risk. For example, during the H5N1 influenza outbreak, FDA and the 




Drug counterfeiting is on the rise. Limited empirical research is available on drug 
counterfeiting, specifically factors and models to assess counterfeiting likelihoods. This 
research could help private and public entities mitigate and minimize counterfeit drug 
reaching consumers.  
 
This research aimed to be exploratory by conducting a thorough analysis of counterfeit 
factors and by developing a model to assess the likelihood of counterfeiting. The findings 
of this research have led to these substantive outcomes: 
• Key counterfeit attribute have been identified: 10 counterfeit attributes were 
identified: Average Price, Drug Class, Medication Class, Product Type, Volume, 





and Product Shortage - through literature reviews, case studies, and experts. These 
combined in three explanatory factors: MCC, PPC, and SCC. 
• A data-driven conceptual model has been developed for drug counterfeit 
built from data: Through the use of exploratory factor analysis, a model emerged 
with above three distinct factors. Through regression analysis, market and product 
history factors were shown to be statistically significant for assessing drugs 
counterfeiting risk.  
• A process and a model to determine probability of drug counterfeiting has 
been developed. This is first time a process and model has been developed to 
assess the probability of drug counterfeiting. This process and model can aide 
decision makers in ranking drug inventory for inspection and sampling purposes.  
 
8.6 Research Limitations  
This research is the first type to explore drug counterfeit factors and developed a model 
to assess likelihood of drug counterfeiting. However, as with all research, there are 
limitations. Some of the limitations of this research are: 
• A limited set of counterfeit data was used to study counterfeit factors. A larger 
number of data may have strengthened the findings in this study. 
• A limited set of experts was used. More experts should be included to gain 
confidence on the counterfeit attributes. Including more experts may have 
strengthened the findings. 
• All of the counterfeiting data used in this study came from pharmaceutical cases. 









The primary focus of this research was to explore factor significance on drug 
counterfeiting and to develop a model to determine the probability of drug counterfeiting. 
Future research could include the following: 
• Conduct a confirmatory factor analysis method on the 10 counterfeit attributes 
and three counterfeit factor derived in this study. This could be done via survey to 
include government and industry experts.  
• Explore the use of Bayesian Belief Networks to model and determine the 
likelihood of drug counterfeiting.  
• Explore developing a consequence model (or analysis) to determine the impact of 
pharmaceutical counterfeiting event on patient safety. This research explores on 







8.8 Guide Map for the Government and Private Industries 
This research highlight the need to have consistent definition among regulatory bodies for 
drug counterfeiting and a need for a global drug counterfeit database to conduct analysis 
and drug surveillance. In addition, supply chain guidelines should be used with the model 
developed in this research. Therefore the following could be implemented: 
• Develop a global definition of drug counterfeiting; 
• Develop a counterfeit database to enable legitimate users to enter counterfeit 
information; the counterfeit attributes presented in this study could be useful to 
develop the first database; and  
• Use the drug counterfeit model to assess and rank regulated drug inventories on a 
monthly basis to determine which products should be under surveillance. Focus 









Modeling the Likelihood of Product Counterfeit  
 






Influence diagram a generalization of a Bayesian Network and can incorporate 
probabilistic relationships between variables, as well as past and current information 
about their relationships. There are extremely useful for modeling scenarios where some 
information is already known and incoming data is uncertain or not available. These 
networks offer consistent semantics for representing cause and effect (and likelihoods) 
via an intuitive graphical representation. The Figure below depicts a simple example of a 
Bayesian network, i.e., there is an influence of Obesity on Steotosis. Influences are 
represented by connecting influencing variables (parent variables) to influenced variables 
(child variables). 
 
The nodes are variables, and the links represent dependencies or casual influences. The 
links allows mapping of dependence relationship between variables and the strength of 
the relationships is expressed by forward conditional probabilities. Each node has a 













Years of Experience: 
 
Organization Type: Private or Public 
 






Regarding Detecting the Likelihood Counterfeiting of Drugs:  
 
1. From your perspective what are the most important factors that influence the risk 
of drug counterfeiting in the US?  
 
 
Evaluation of Model  
 
Examine the influence diagram (BBN) provided. Based on the influence diagram you 
provided, let’s fill in parts that you mentioned, and also are missing from this model.  
 
[Interviewer will iteratively work with the interviewee/subject to incorporate or exclude 








Evaluation for Expert 
 
Completeness: From your perspective, to what extend does this model capture all 
important and relevant phenomena for the particular problem under study? On a 
scale 0 to 100, 0 would correspond to a model that does not include some 
important and relevant details, where as 100 would correspond to a model that 






Accuracy: From your perspective, how accurately or realistically does the model 
depict important facts that predict the risk of pharmaceutical being counterfeited? 
On a scale from 0 to 100, 0 would correspond to a model that is unrealistic or 
inaccurate, while a 100 would correspond to a model is realistic and accurate: 
 
Ease of Understanding: From your perspective, how easy it is to understand the 
overall logic of the model. On a scale from 0 to 100, 0 would correspond to a 
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